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Abstract 
The capital structure theory was pioneered by Modigliani and Miller (1958).  In their study, 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argued that capital structure was irrelevant to firm value.  
There is also significant theory on the capital structure of firms and its determinants.    
Using a panel of non-financial firms listed on the JSE Securities Exchange, we investigate the 
relevance of capital structure on firm value and investigate the capital structure of firms in 
South Africa.  The results of the analysis on the relevance of capital structure on firm value 
indicated that there is no statistically significant relationship between firm value and the 
capital structure of firms.  This analysis was conducted for the general sample of firms in the 
study, within industries and by firm size, however, the results were consistent throughout 
all the analysis. 
The results of the capital structure and its determinants analysis indicated that South 
African firms followed a pecking order theory.  The results also indicated that profitability, 
size, asset tangibility and tax shield has a statistically significant relationship to gearing or 
the firm’s capital structure.  The analysis of the South African firms’ capital structure 
indicated that firms in South Africa tend to use more long-term debt than short-term debt.  
The leverage ratios also differed among industries with the Health care industry having the 
highest levels of leverage and the Technology industry having the lowest levels of leverage. 
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1 Chapter one - Introduction 
1.1 Background Literature 
There is a considerable number of theories and research on the effect of capital structure on 
firm value, size and profitability.  The capital structure of the firm refers to the sources of 
funding used to finance a firm’s investments.  This refers to the choice between equity 
financing and debt financing.  According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), the value of the 
firm, that is, its stock price, does not depend on the capital structure of the firm.  This 
theory by Modigliani and Miller is based on a set of simplifying assumptions. These 
assumptions include no taxes, no transaction costs and no information asymmetry.  The 
theory says that the total market value of all financial assets issued by a firm is determined 
by the risk and return of the firm’s real assets, not by the mix of issued securities (Byström, 
2007).   
The main idea behind Modigliani and Miller’s theory is that a rational investor can create 
any capital structure on his/her own.  Therefore, the firm should not focus much on its 
capital structure.  “If the investor is highly indebted, the risk and return of the firm’s stock 
(to the investor) will simply be the same as if the firm was highly levered” (Byström, 2007).  
This substitution called homemade leverage and the finding that a more leveraged firm 
doesn’t only yield higher returns to the investor but also a higher risk, is the crux of 
Modigliani and Miller’s theory.  
There is a theory that states the value of the firm, in a world with corporate taxes, is 
positively related to its debt. This theory, which is known as the trade-off theory, states that 
profitable firms will tend to use more debt in order to capture the tax shield offered by debt 
financing of investments.  According to this theory, in an all-equity firm, only shareholders 
and tax authorities have claims on the firm.  The value of the firm is owned by the 
shareholders and the portion going to taxes is just a cost.  The value of the levered firm has 
three claimants, namely: the shareholders, debt holders and tax recipients (Government).  
Therefore, the value of the levered firm is the sum of the value of the debt and the value of 
the equity.  In these instances, value is maximised with the structure paying the least in the 
form of taxes (Hillier, et al., 2010).  
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Other theories on capital structure include the pecking order theory and the market timing 
theory.  According to the pecking order theory firms prefer internal finance and if external 
finance is required, firms issue the safest security first.  That is, they start with debt, then 
possibly hybrid securities then equity as a last resort (Myers, 1984).  This assumes that a 
firm’s debt ratio will be reflective of its cumulative requirements for external finance.  In 
contrast to the trade -off and pecking order theories of capital structure, Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) found that firms with low levels of leverage raised capital when their market 
valuations were high as measured by the market-to -book ratio whereas firms with high 
levels of leverage raised capital when their market valuations were low.  This theory is 
known as the market timing capital structure theory. 
According to research by Kurshev and Strebulaev (2005), it has been established that large 
firms in the United States tend to have higher leverage ratios than smaller firms.  
International evidence suggests that in most, though not all countries, leverage is also cross-
sectionally positively related to size.  Intuitively, firm size should be relevant or related to 
leverage for a number of reasons.  Firstly, in the presence of fixed costs of raising external 
funds, large firms have cheaper access to outside financing. Also large firms are more likely 
to diversify their sources of financing.  Secondly, size may also be a proxy for the probability 
of default because it is often assumed that it is more difficult for larger firms to fail or 
liquidate.  Firm size may also be a proxy for the volatility of firm assets because small firms 
are more likely to be growing firms in industries that are rapidly expanding and intrinsically 
volatile.  Another reason for the significance of firm size is the extent of the wedge in the 
degree of information asymmetry between insiders and the capital markets which  have a 
tendency to prefer larger firms by virtue of a greater scrutiny they face from the ever – 
suspicious investors (Kurshev and Strebulaev, 2005).   
Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009), one of the most encompassing studies that have been conducted 
on African markets including South Africa, found that companies in these markets tend to 
follow a modified pecking order.  Their study looked at five African markets (Ghana, Kenya, 
Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe) collectively.  In their study, Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) 
tested for capital structure dependence on variables such as asset tangibility, corporate tax, 
profitability, size and firm age.  In terms of Gwatidzo and Ojah’s (2009) finding, is that what 
happens in South Africa which has sophisticated institutional and physical capital markets 
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infrastructure?  Is the legal environment encompassing clearly stated and enforced laws?  
Are the courts effective in forcing borrowers to honour business contracts? 
1.2 Problem Statement 
How well do firms in South Africa understand the dominant capital structure in their sector 
and general economy?  The problem is that not knowing the average cost of external funds 
will lead firms to make inadequately informed capital budgeting decisions.  For a firm to 
grow it has to embark on value adding projects; hence effective capital budgeting is 
indispensable.   
One of the ways for enhancing the effectiveness of the capital budgeting process is to 
estimate cash flows from the projects and the cost of capital.  If a company does not have a 
good sense of what the dominant capital structure is in the market, it will not have a good 
sense of what the appropriate cost of external capital should be, whether debt or equity.   
Even though there have been many studies on capital structure, the bulk of these studies 
focused on developed capital markets.  The literature on capital structure and its effect on 
firm value is still very thin in the African context.    
1.3 Purpose Statement 
Apart from trying to shed sufficient light on the dominant capital structure in South Africa, 
this study attempts to answer the question of: what is the role of capital structure in firm 
valuation? In addition, the role of other market and economic variables like taxation will be 
assessed using a regression model and data drawn from financial markets.  
To date, Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) conducted one of the few most comprehensive studies 
in Africa on capital structure.  This study is therefore intended to build upon the work that 
has been conducted so far and to contribute to the body of literature with the following 
questions as guidelines: 
 Is capital structure irrelevant as per MM I? 
 What is the capital structure (debt-to-equity) of firms per industry in South Africa? 
 How persistent is the equity-debt capital structure? 
 What factors determine the equity-debt structure divide? 
 What is the debt structure in terms of funding between long term and short term 
debt? 
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 How persistent is the long term-short term structure? 
1.4 Significance of study 
Limited research exists on the capital structure of firms in Africa, as a result we know little 
about how these firms make capital structure decisions (Gwatidzo and Ojah, 2009).It is, 
therefore, necessary to deliberate on the capital structure of firms in Africa.   
Firms in Africa operate within a different environment as compared with firms in developed 
countries mainly due to the differences in institutional infrastructure.  Capital markets in 
Africa are characterised by inefficiency, they are small and thinly traded (Singh, 1999).  In 
contrast, capital markets in developed economies are characterised by well-functioning and 
efficient stock markets and well developed credit markets.  It is therefore inappropriate to 
claim that the findings that come out of studies done on developed economies apply to 
developing economies such as the African market.  
This research may prove useful in filling the research gap that exists in the literature and 
increase our understanding of the capital decisions taken by firms in South Africa. 
1.5 Data and Methodology 
1.5.1 Data 
The research analysis will be carried out on the firms listed on the JSE Securities Exchange 
(JSE), excluding financial firms.  Financial firms are excluded because their capital structure 
is different from that of non-financial firms, as their capital structure, sources and allocation 
of funds are dictated by regulations including mainly the capital adequacy ratio and reserve 
requirement.  The distinction between the deposit type debt and the outright debt of 
financial firms is blurred, which also makes the capital structure of these firms difficult to 
distinguish.  The study will focus on listed firms because of the availability of data as listed 
firms have several data sources above and beyond their financial reports.  The data that will 
be used for the analysis will be largely financial data, drawn mainly from the Bloomberg 
database.  Bloomberg is the preferred source of the required financial data relating to the 
firms on the JSE because it is a relatively all-encompassing data base of global information, 
however, McGregorBFA was also used as a source of data.  The financial data compiled and 
used for the analysis will be in panel data form. 
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1.5.2 Methodology 
Regression analysis will be used in answering the research questions.  “Regression analysis is 
a statistical tool for the investigation of relationships between variables [whereby]… the 
investigator assembles data on the underlying variables of interest and employs regression 
to estimate the quantitative effects of the causal variables upon the variable that they 
influence” (Sykes, 2003).  The data collected on the JSE listed firms will be analysed using 
econometric techniques and a tool pack called E-views.  Relevant economic theories and 
empirical studies will be examined in order to build the most appropriate structure for 
assessing the hypothesized relationships.  
1.6 Outline of the Study 
The outline of the research paper will be as follows.  Section 2 will elaborate the relevant 
literature.   Section 3 will detail the research questions and hypothesis.  Section 4 will 
outline the methodology in detail, elaborating on the data, techniques employed and the 
model.  Section 5 will contain the presentation and analysis of the results from the empirical 
analysis and Section 6 will draw conclusions on the findings of the research or make 
inferences for possible future research. 
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2 Chapter two - Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
Capital structure decisions can have important implications for the value of the firm and its 
cost of capital (Firer et al, 2008).  Inadequate capital structure decisions can lead to a large 
cost of capital thereby lowering the net present value (NPV) of the firm’s investment 
projects making the investment projects unacceptable i.e the underinvestment problem.  
Efficient capital structure decisions will lower the firm’s cost of capital and increase the NPV 
of the firm’s investment projects leading to more projects being suitable to accept thereby 
increasing the value of the firm. 
Capital structure is a very significant decision for firms to make so that they can maximize 
returns to their various stakeholders.  Furthermore the correct capital structure is important 
to the firm as it will aid in dealing with the competitive environment within which the firm 
operates.  According to Modigliani and Miller (1958) an ‘optimal’ capital structure exists 
when the risks of going bankrupt is offset by the tax savings of debt.  When this optimal 
capital structure is realised, a firm would be able to maximise returns to its stakeholders 
that are higher than returns that would be attained from a firm whose capital consists of 
equity only i.e an all equity firm. 
Despite the importance that capital structure can play in adding value to the firm, decades 
worth of theoretical literature and empirical testing have not been able to give guidance to 
practitioners with regards to the choice between debt and equity in their capital structures 
(Frank & Goyal, 2009).  It is rather baffling to try to logically understand capital structure 
literature because different capital structure theories are frequently utterly opposed in their 
predictions while sometimes they may be in agreement but have opposing views about why 
the outcome has been predicted.  It is for this reason that Myers (2001) stated that there is 
no universal theory of capital structure, only conditional ones.  Factors that are of 
significance in one context may be of substantial insignificance in another.  
There is a number of theories relating to the capital structure and its effect on firm value 
and its performance. Modigliani and Miller (1958) were the leading authors to landmark the 
topic of capital structure and they argued that capital structure was irrelevant in 
determining the value of the firm and its future performance.  Many other studies including, 
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Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994) have argued that there exists a relationship between capital 
structure and firm value.   
In more recent studies, authors have displayed that they are less concerned about how 
capital structure affects the firm value.  They, however, place more emphasis on how capital 
structure impacts the ownership/governance structure thereby influencing top 
management of the firms to make strategic decisions (Hitt, Hoskisson & Harrison, 1991).  
These decisions will in turn impact on the overall performance of the firm (Jensen, 1986). 
2.2 Defining capital structure 
The notion of financial management can be defined as a managerial activity, which is highly 
concerned about controlling and planning of firm’s financial resources, (Pandey & Bhat, 
2007). Furthermore, the functions of finance encompass a diverse area. These functions 
comprise choices on investments, choices on financing, choices on dividends, and choices on 
liquidity. This paper encompasses aspects with respects to the financing decision of a 
company i.e deciding on how to obtain funds in order to fulfil the firm’s needs of 
investments.  
The study of capital structure centres around the mix between debt, equity and the range of 
other hybrid instruments used to finance the investments of the firm.  Capital structure is 
therefore concerned with the right hand side of the balance sheet (Myers, 2002).  All items 
on the right hand side of the balance sheet, excluding current liabilities, are sources of 
capital employed to finance the real assets required to conduct the business of the firm 
(Dreyer, 2009).  Below is a simplified graphical depiction of the capital structure. 
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Figure 1: APPLICATION AND SOURCES OF FUNDING (An adoption from Ward & Price, 2006 
pgs. 24 - 24) 
The equity holders are the owners of the firm and bear most of the risk associated with the 
business venture since they normally only have a residual claim to the assets of the firm 
(Dreyer, 2009).  According to Gitman (2003) equity holders are rewarded for their 
investment primarily through the appreciation of the value of their common equity and in 
some instances through the receipt of dividends. 
Debt holders are compensated through interest payments and usually insist on some form 
of collateral as security for the loans they provide.  Debt holders may also protect their 
interest through the establishment of loan covenants.  They also have first claim on the 
assets of a firm and bear less risk than the equity holders.  Debt is therefore a generally 
cheaper funding option to equity (Gitman, 2003). 
If you want to evaluate the performance of the firm it is important to consider all interest 
bearing borrowings as loan capital regardless of whether they are short term or long term 
loans (Ward & Price, 2008).  Firms manage their capital structure by issuing new debt and 
equity and by settling old debt or repurchasing issued shares. 
2.3 Defining firm value 
It is frequently stated that the goal of financial management is to maximise the wealth of 
the shareholders or owners of the firm.  According to Firer et al (2008) the goal of financial 
management is to maximise the current value per share of the existing shares.  However, 
Fixed assets
Working capital
Net assets Capital
Equity
Loans
Retained 
profit
Equity 
capital
Overdraft
Long-term
loans
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owners only have a residual claim to the assets of the firm and are only paid once every 
other stakeholder with a legitimate claim to the firm’s assets has been paid.  Since the 
lenders, employees and suppliers all have a superior claim on the firm’s assets, it stands to 
reason that if the owners’ wealth is maximised then all the other claimants will stand to 
gain.   
It ought to be noted that profit maximisation and wealth maximisation are not synonymous 
terms.  A firm can engage in a variety of activities that may increase short-term profit that 
are either not translated into cash flows like selling to customers with a low probability of 
paying or engaging in other activities which are not profitable and sustainable.   
The timing and magnitude of cash flows and their associated risk are therefore the key 
drivers of the firms share price and the wealth maximisation of the owners of the firm (Firer 
et al, 2008). 
To attain the goal of shareholder wealth maximisation, financial managers are confronted 
with two imperative financial decisions, the investment and financing decisions.  The 
investment decision or capital budgeting is the process of planning and managing a firm’s 
long-term investments and identifying investment opportunities that are worth more to the 
firm than they cost to acquire (Firer et al, 2008).  The financing decision or capital structure 
decision refers to the specific mixture of long-term debt and equity the firm uses to finance 
its operations (Firer et al, 2008).   
The financing decision, therefore, compels the financial manager to decide on whether to 
fund projects that the firm undertakes through retained earnings, debt or equity or other 
hybrid funding instruments.  The funding mixture chosen will affect both the risk and value 
of the firm (Firer et al, 2008).  
2.4 Capital structure theories 
There are a number of capital structure theories but for the purposes of this study we will 
review only the three most prevalent theories, the trade-off theory, the pecking order 
theory and the market timing theory. 
To start off the section we will look at the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theory of capital 
structure irrelevance.   
  10 
2.4.1 Modigliani and Miller’s capital structure irrelevance 
The departure point for virtually all discussions on capital structure theory is Modigliani and 
Miller’s capital structure irrelevance theory first published in 1958 (Dreyer, 2010).  
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958) financing doesn’t matter in perfect capital 
markets.  The value of the firm is maximised by the quality and productivity of the assets in 
which the firm has invested.   
Consider the market-value balance sheet below: 
 
Figure 2: MARKET-VALUE BALANCE SHEET (Myers, 2001 pg.85) 
The market values of the firm's debt and equity, D and E, add up to total firm value V and 
Modigliani  and Miller's (1958) Proposition 1 says that V is a constant, regardless  of  the  
proportions of D and E, provided  that the  assets and growth opportunities on the left-hand 
side of the balance sheet are held constant (Myers, 2001).   
The Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) Proposition 1 as captured in the equation below also 
states that (Firer et al, 2008): 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Where: 
VL= the value of the levered firm 
VU= the value of the unlevered firm 
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The expression above states that the value of the levered firm (VL) is equal to the value of 
the unlevered firm (VU) (Firer et al, 2008).   
According to Firer et al (2008) this implies that: 
 A firm’s capital structure is irrelevant. 
 A firm’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is the same no matter what 
mixture of debt and equity is used to finance the firm. 
It is of importance to note that this capital structure irrelevance theory by Modigliani and 
Miller only holds under the assumption of perfect capital markets.  These perfect capital 
markets are defined by Modigliani and Miller as follows: 
 Homogeneous shares of different firms which are perfect substitutes of each other 
 All shares being traded under the perfect capital market conditions 
 Known expected future returns on all shares by investors 
 Irrespective of the issuer the cost of debt is the same 
In concluding their seminal paper Modigliani and Miller (1958) stated that these and other 
drastic simplifications had been necessary in order to come to grips with the capital 
structure problem, and having served their purpose they could now be relaxed in the 
direction of greater realism and relevance. 
2.4.2 The trade-off theory 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) delivered a correction of their 1958 seminal paper and stated 
that “The deduction of interest in computing taxable corporate profits will prevent the 
arbitrage process from making the value of all firms in a given class proportional to the  
expected returns generated by their physical assets” (Modigliani & Miller, 1963). 
The correction restated the Proposition 1 equation to be expressed as (Firer et al, 2008): 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Where: 
VL= the value of the levered firm 
VU= the value of the unlevered firm 
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TC= the corporate tax rate 
D = the amount of debt 
The above expression states that the value of the levered firm (VL) is equal to the value of 
the unlevered firm (VU) plus the present value of the interest tax shield (Firer et al, 2008). 
The principal value of debt is the fact that interest payments earned on the repayment of 
debt is deductible from corporate income tax.  Debt, however, does have shortcomings that 
include an increased probability of bankruptcy if the firm failed to service its obligations, the 
agency costs earned by the lender to monitor the activities of the firm and the fact that 
managers have better prospects of the firm than the investors do (Gitman, 2003). 
The trade-off theory rationalises reasonable debt ratios. It says that the firm will borrow up 
to the point where the marginal value of tax shields on additional debt is just offset by the 
increase in the present value of possible costs of financial distress (Myers, 2001).  According 
to Fama and French (2005) this optimal capital structure is attained when the marginal 
benefit of an extra unit of debt is offset by the marginal cost of an extra unit of debt.   
Meyers (2001) also states that, a value-maximizing firm should never pass up interest tax 
shields when the probability of financial distress is remotely low.  As according to Gitman 
(2003) it is widely accepted that the value of the firm is maximised when its cost of capital is 
minimised. 
Below is a modified zero growth dividend model used to determine the value of the firm 
(Gitman, 2003): 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Where: 
V = the value of the firm 
EBIT= earnings before interest and taxes 
T = tax rate 
EBIT x (1-T) = after tax operating earnings available to debt and equity holders 
Ka = weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
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It can be concluded from the expression above that if the earnings of the firm (EBIT) are 
held constant, the value of the firm (V) will be maximised when the average cost of capital 
(Ka) is minimised (Dreyer, 2010).  
2.4.2.1 The advantages of debt 
Debt has a number of advantages for shareholder wealth maximisation some of which are 
discussed below: 
2.4.2.1.1 Interest tax shield 
Because interest payments can be deducted from the basic corporate profits tax but not 
dividends, it lowers the expected tax liability to add debt to a firm’s capital structure and 
thereby increases its after-tax cash flow (Barclay & Smith, 2005).  According to Opler et al 
(1997) the value of the tax shield provided by debt in a given year is a function of the 
interest amount paid by the firm and its marginal tax rate.  For a firm that expects increased 
future earnings it is advisable to consider taking on more debt in order to shield earnings 
from taxes. 
2.4.2.1.2 Reduced agency costs 
In the simple form of the agency cost problem, financial managers may not act in the best 
interest of shareholders particularly when excessive free cash flows are present electing to 
spend cash on things like corporate empire building, perks, making overpriced acquisitions  
or simply failing  to operate efficiently (Dreyer, 2010).  For the cases discussed above both 
debt and the payment of dividends can be used as ways of disciplining managers (Graham & 
Harvey, 2001). 
2.4.2.1.3 Controlling overinvestment  
Lowered levels of debt can lead to overinvestment.  Overinvestment is a phenomenon that 
occurs when the operating cash flow is not reinvested profitably within the firm by financial 
managers.  This may be as a result of unprofitably investing in the firm’s core businesses, or 
worse, diversifying by acquiring unfamiliar business.  
Debt can provide an effective solution to this phenomenon through contractually obliged 
interest and principal payments which squeezes out excess capital (Barclay & Smith, 2005).  
This could also be achieved through paying out the excess free cash to shareholders as a 
dividend and incurring debt to fund the capital projects of the firm.  Debt can also force 
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financial managers to be more thorough when evaluating the firm’s capital plans and their 
implications before they undertake them. 
2.4.2.2 The disadvantages of debt 
Debt has a number of disadvantages for shareholder wealth maximisation some of which 
are discussed below: 
2.4.2.2.1 The cost of financial distress 
Interest tax deductibility of debt is one of the main propositions made by the trade-off 
theory.  However, if the firm had to undergo a period of operating at reduced levels of 
profitability the value of the interest tax shield will be reduced to zero.  The burden of the 
interest expense will in this case only serve increase the financial distress experienced by 
the firm (Dreyer, 2010). 
2.4.2.2.2 Agency costs 
Agency costs can be defined as costs that arise due to conflict of interest and this conflict of 
interest can be between the shareholders and managers of a firm or between the debt 
holders and equity holders of a firm (Harris & Raviv, 1991).   
Manager- Shareholder:  Ryen et al (1997) state that the two main areas of manager-
shareholder conflict arise when managers fail to best represent the interests of 
shareholders through  underleveraging thereby forgoing substantial shareholder value and  
overspending.  This unwillingness by managers to leverage the firm to its optimal levels may 
be due to the fact that more debt would increase the total risk of the firm.   
Equity holder-Debtholder: There is a number of ways in which equityholders can increase 
their wealth through the exploitation of debtholders after a bond issue.  This could be done 
through underinvestment which entails rejecting positive NPV projects if their benefits 
accrue only to debtholders, issuing new debt that is of a higher priority than the existing 
debt, floating debt for low risk projects and using the free cash for high risk projects, and at 
the extreme, through an increased dividend rate risk the chance of liquidating the firm.   
In such instances, debtholders can protect themselves through the inclusion of covenants in 
their debt agreements.  These covenants can, however, lead to problems with production, 
underinvestment and the financing of the firm (Ryen et al, 1997).   
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2.4.2.2.3 Underinvestment 
According to Barclay and Smith (2005)even in situations that are less extreme than 
bankruptcy, highly leveraged firms are more likely than their less leveraged counterparts to 
forgo valuable investment opportunities when faced with the prospect of the inability to 
service their financial obligations.  This underinvestment problem can be heightened by the 
conflict that can arise among the other claimants of the firm such as shareholders who may 
feel that their investment will be directed towards restoring the financial position of the 
firm’s bondholders instead of creating wealth for them within the firm.  In this instance, the 
cost of the new equity could be so excessive that managers might rationally forgo both the 
capital plans and the investment opportunities (Myers, 1997; Barclay & Smith, 2005). 
Ryen et al (1997) also observed that besides passing up positive net present value (NPV) 
projects that would maximise the value of the firm, managers would forgo investing 
adequate effort in developing and maintaining company-specific human capital.   
2.4.2.3 The dynamic trade-off theory 
In the traditional/static trade-off theory firms select a target leverage level by weighting the 
benefits (which include the tax deductibility of interest and the reduction of the free cash 
flow problem) and costs (which include the expected financial distress costs and the costs 
arising from the agency conflict between shareholders and bondholders) of an additional 
unit of debt (Ovtchinnikov, 2010).  Below is a graphical illustration of the static trade-off 
theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: THE STATIC TRADE-OFF THEORY OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE (Myers, 1984 pg.577) 
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Unlike the static trade-off theory, which implicitly assumes that firms always stay at target 
leverage by continuously adjusting leverage to the target, the dynamic version recognizes 
that financing frictions make it suboptimal for firms to continuously adjust leverage to the 
target.  Under the dynamic trade-off theory, firms weigh the benefit of adjusting against the 
adjustment cost and make leverage adjustments only when the benefit outweighs the cost 
(Ovtchinnikov, 2010). 
The above implies that should the market conditions become adverse, a firm may spend 
some time away from its target capital structure and only return  back to them when 
conditions are favourable.  The level of speed at which a firm reverts back to its target 
capital structure will depend on whether the firm is above or below the target leverage 
ratio.  This may be due to the fact that, when a firm operates at a level of debt significantly 
above the industry mean, the cost of financial distress increases markedly and rebalancing 
the capital structure becomes a significantly more meaningful task (Cai & Ghosh, 2003).   
According to Myers (1984) the explanation of the dynamic trade-off theory regarding 
frictions that prevent firms from remaining at or near their target capital structure is not 
fully satisfactory as it is not stated to be of first order concern in the static trade-off theory.  
Costs cannot be so large that they could force managers to take lengthy deviations from 
their target levels of optimal capital structure, greater analysis should be spent on 
understanding and explaining these frictions rather than refining the static trade-off theory 
(Myers, 1984).   
2.4.3 Pecking order theory  
In the pecking order theory there is no well-defined target of the debt-equity mix, because 
there are two kinds of equity, internal and external, one at the top of the pecking order and 
one at the bottom for each firm's observed debt ratio reflects its cumulative requirements 
for external finance(Myers, 1984). The pecking order arises if the costs of issuing risky 
securities such as transactions costs and the costs created by management’s superior 
information about the value of the firm’s risky securities overwhelm the costs and benefits 
proposed by the trade-off model (Fama & French, 2005). 
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According to the pecking order theory, firms will first finance new investments with retained 
earnings, then with safe debt, then risky debt and finally, but only under duress, with 
outside equity in order to lessen adverse selection costs (Fama & French, 2005).  Below is a 
graphical illustration of the pecking order theory.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: THE FINANCING HIERACHY OF THE PECKING ORDER (Leary & Roberts, 2010 
pg.334) 
Although the pecking order theory is based on the adverse selection based on information 
asymmetry, it has been proven that information asymmetry does not need to exist for a 
financing hierarchy to arise.  It has, however, been shown that other factors such as 
incentive conflicts could generate a pecking order behaviour (Leary & Roberts, 2010).  
Titman and Wessels (1988) also found that transaction costs may also be an important 
factor in the pecking order behaviour and this is substantiated by the fact that short-term 
debt ratios are negatively related to firm size.  This variance in financing practice probably 
reflects the high transaction costs that small firms face when they issue long-term debt or 
equity (Titman & Wessels, 1988). 
It is usually thought of the cost of external finance as that of administration and 
underwriting and in other cases the under-pricing of new securities, however, asymmetric 
information creates the possibility of costs related to rejecting positive net present value 
(NPV) projects.  One such incentive cost could be the reflection on the shareholders of a 
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firm that the managers are not adequately representing the interest of the shareholders 
through their excessive risk averse.  Managers may on the other hand feel that they have 
more information on the cost and benefits of debt than shareholders when choosing to pass 
up on new investment opportunities when the earnings of the firm or investment project 
are volatile (Lewellen, 2006).   
Although a firm might have initiated a pecking order, it may sometimes choose to not follow 
the pecking order so that it can maintain a spare debt capacity or hold internal earnings in 
favour of debt if it is believed that it will be essential to fund profitable future investment 
opportunities (Ryen et al, 1997).   
The other reason why firms might choose to maintain a spare debt capacity would be to 
maintain their credit ratings.  Spare debt capacity also enhances the firm’s ability to endure 
periods of poor performance and allows for the execution of a recovery plan (Shivdasani & 
Zenner, 2005).   
2.4.4 The market timing theory 
Equity market timing refers to the practice of issuing shares at a high price (when their 
valuations are higher relative to book value and past market valuations) and repurchasing 
them at low prices (when their market valuations are lower).  As a result observed capital 
structures are a function of the past market valuations of securities instead of a desire to 
attain an optimum capital structure or as a consequence of following a pecking order (Baker 
& Wurgler, 2002).   
According to Baker and Wurgler (2002) four outcomes of their empirical studies support 
their market timing hypothesis, and they are as follows: 
 An analysis of past financing decisions show that firms tend to issue equity instead of 
debt when their share price is higher relative to the book value and previous market 
values and they tend to repurchase the shares when their current market values are 
lower than past values 
 Analyses of long-run stock returns following corporate finance decisions suggest that 
timing the equity market is successful for firms on average (Dreyer, 2010) 
 Earnings forecasts and realisations around equity issues suggest that firms issue equity 
where there is investor market optimism about future earnings prospects (Dreyer, 2010) 
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 Two thirds of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) admit to market timing in anonymous 
surveys (Dreyer, 2010) 
According to DeAngelo et al (2010) most firms with attractive market timing opportunities 
tend to fail to issue stock.  One probable reason for this failure to issue stock is the investor 
rationality that would influence the managers to disguise their attempts to sell overvalued 
stocks. Rational investors would almost instantly recognise any attempts to sell off 
overvalued stocks and as a result would reduce the price they are willing to pay for the 
stock.  As indicated by Baker and Wurgler (2002) one other explanation could be that 
managers are simply unable to time the market.  This seems to resonate with the recent 
events where prominent financial institutions repurchased their shares at higher prices after 
the 2008 financial meltdown (DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Stulz, 2010). 
DeAngelo et al (2010) have concerted to the view that firms issue stocks primarily to fund 
the firm’s short-term liquidity needs and market timing only plays an ancillary role in making 
the decision. 
2.5 The capital structure landscape 
An abstract overview of the elements that impact or influence capital structure decisions 
are graphically depicted below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: CONCEPTUAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE LANDSCAPE (Adaptation from Dreyer, 2010) 
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As indicated in the figure above, in the centre lies the optimal capital structure range for a 
firm.  The perceived capital structure may or may not be in this optimal capital range.  A firm 
experiencing financial distress or one without any debt in its capital structure are examples 
of firms that are not within their optimal capital structure range (Dreyer, 2010). 
A considerable number of firms with a target capital structure often spend a significant 
amount of time deviating from the target structure.  This deviation from the target capital 
structure could be as a result of variations in equity valuations, market abrasions or varying 
investment opportunities.  The firm is expected overtime to undertake activities that will 
revert the firm towards its target capital structure. 
Directly outside the optimal capital structure range is a number of factors impacting on the 
decision about what would constitute an ideal capital structure of optimal capital structure 
range (Dreyer, 2010).  This level consists of two types of elements.  The first element is of a 
theoretical make that is assumed to impact the practitioners.  The second element is of a 
practical make like the accessibility of investment opportunities and liquidity funding needs.   
The level after the previous one entails firm specific elements like the level of maturity of 
the firm, the firm’s level of profitability and its level of investment in physical and intangible 
assets. 
The second outer most ring entails industry specific factors such as the volatility of the 
industry’s revenues, its typical debt-to-equity ratios etc (Dreyer, 2010). 
The last level is the macro –economic environment within which a firm operates including 
the legal and political factors affecting the firm and all circumstances within which the 
business has to thrive. 
As it can be seen in the model above, the capital structure decision is not an autonomous 
one.  It is of utmost importance to understand the landscape within which the capital 
structure decision has to be made in order to eliminate the use of unsound assumptions 
when making the decision. 
2.6 Literature on the effect of capital structure on firm value 
After four decades of intense scrutiny, capital structure effect on firm value continues to be 
a popular research topic in finance and accounting literature. The optimal capital structure, 
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pecking order, agency theory and signalling theories have all contributed very useful but 
sometimes mixed guidance to academics and practitioners seeking to understand what 
management’s financing decisions do to the value of a firm (Oraluck & Mohamed, 2004). 
A number of studies have been recently carried out on the effect of capital structure on firm 
value from countries such as Australia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, China and Nigeria.  Their 
findings are presented below. 
Australia:  
If capital rationing is a difficult challenge faced by management of firms, then it would 
perhaps be right to assume that funders such as shareholders (when equity is offered) and 
the debt-providers (when debt is issued) are likely to be influenced by how they value a 
firm’s capital structure in relation to the industry average capital structure at the time 
management goes out to the market for funding. 
The Australian study looked at both debt and equity disclosures to observe and quantify 
value-enhancing and value-reducing capital structure changes of 10-50 per cent.  The 
research design centred around the concept of relative capital structure by relating a firm’s 
debt-equity ratio to that of the industry median in each year over a 13-year period (1991 – 
2003). 
The findings from the study indicated that the market reacts positively to announcements of 
financing events that lead to the firm’s capital structure moving closer to their relative 
industry median debt-equity ratio. For firms changing the debt-equity ratios away from the 
median (value decreasing events) it lead to either less positive or negative abnormal 
returns. These are consistent with the idea of optimal capital structure, if relative capital 
structure is a proxy for optimal ratio. Thus, the market perceives the industry median as an 
appropriate capital structure benchmark in the Australian market (Oraluck & Mohamed, 
2004). 
Pakistan: 
The Pakistan research examined the impact of capital structure on firms’ financial 
performance in Pakistan of top 100 consecutive companies in Karachi Stock Exchange for a 
period of four years from 2006 to 2009. Exponential generalized least square regression was 
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used to test the relationship between capital structure and firms’ financial performance 
(Muhammad et al, 2012).   
The results showed that all the three variables of capital structure, Current Liabilities to 
Total Assets, Long Term Liabilities to Total Assets, Total Liabilities to Total Assets, negatively 
impacts the Earnings Before Interest and Taxes, Return on Assets, Earning Per Share and Net 
Profit Margin whereas the Price Earnings Ratio shows a negative relationship with Current 
Liabilities to Total Assets and a positive relationship is found with Long Term Liabilities to 
Total Assets where the relationship is insignificant with Total Liabilities to Total Assets. The 
results also indicate that Return on Equity has a insignificant impact on Current Liabilities to 
Total Assets and Total Liabilities to Total Assets but a positive relationship exists with Long 
Term Liabilities to Total Assets. These results, in general, lead to the conclusion that capital 
structure choice is an important determinant of financial performance of firms (Muhammad 
et al, 2012). 
Bangladesh: 
The Bangladesh paper attempts to test the influence of debt-equity structure on the value 
of shares given different sizes, industries and growth opportunities with the companies 
incorporated in Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and Chittagong Stock Exchange (CSE) of 
Bangladesh. For the robustness of the analysis samples were drawn from the four most 
dominant sectors of industry i.e. engineering, food & allied, fuel & power, and chemical & 
pharmaceutical to provide a comparative analysis. A strong positively correlated association 
is evident from the empirical findings when stratified by industry (Anup & Suman, 2010). 
To see the relationship between capital structure and firm value in Bangladesh the reserch 
paper considered share price as proxy for value and different ratios for capital structure 
decision. The interesting finding of this paper suggests that maximizing the wealth of 
shareholders requires a perfect combination of debt and equity, whereas cost of capital has 
a negative correlation in this decision and it has to be as minimal as possible. This is also 
seen that by changing the capital structure composition a firm can increase its value in the 
market. Nonetheless, this could be a significant policy implication for finance managers, 
because they can utilize debt to form optimal capital structure to maximize the wealth of 
shareholders (Anup & Suman, 2010). 
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China: 
The research paper examined the influence of managerial ownership on firm performance 
through capital-structure choices, using a sample of China’s civilian-run firms listed on the 
Chinese stock market between 2002 and 2007. The empirical results demonstrate a 
nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. Managerial 
ownership drives the capital structure into a nonlinear shape, but in an opposite direction to 
the effect of managerial ownership on firm value. The results of simultaneous regressions 
suggest that managerial ownership affects capital structure, which in turn affects firm value 
(Ruan et al, 2011).  
It was also found that managerial ownership does not influence firm value significantly 
when capital structure is added into the equation.  Managerial ownership significantly 
affects capital structure, and capital structure affects corporate performance directly. These 
results address the influence of managerial shareholding on capital structure, which in turn 
affects firm value. Furthermore, capital structure is endogenously determined by both firm 
value and managerial ownership in Chinese civilian-run listed companies between 2002 and 
2007 (Ruan et al, 2011).   
Nigeria: 
Two studies on the effect of capital structure were carried out in Nigeria and their findings 
are as follows. 
The first study examined the impact of capital structure on the performance of 
manufacturing companies in Nigeria. The annual financial statements of 15 manufacturing 
companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange were used for this study which covers a 
period of five (5) years from 2005-2009. A multiple regression analysis was applied on 
performance indicators such as Return on Asset (ROA) and Profit Margin (PM) as well as 
Short-term debt to Total assets (STDTA), Long term debt to Total assets (LTDTA) and Total 
debt to Equity (TDE) as capital structure variables. The results show that there is a negative 
and insignificant relationship between STDTA and LTDTA, and ROA and PM; while TDE is 
positively related with ROA and negatively related with PM. STDTA is significant using ROA 
while LTDTA is significant using PM. The study concluded that statistically, capital structure 
is not a major determinant of firm performance. It recommends that managers of 
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manufacturing companies should exercise caution while choosing the amount of debt to use 
in their capital structure as it affects their performance negatively (Iorpev & Kwanum, 2012). 
The second study aimed to provide evidence on the impact of capital structure on a firm’s 
value. The analysis was implemented on a sample of 124 companies quoted on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange (NSE) for the year ended 31st December 2007. The ordinary least squares 
method of regression was employed in carrying out this analysis. The result of the study 
reveals that in an emerging economy like Nigeria, equity capital as a component of capital 
structure is irrelevant to the value of a firm, while Long-term-debt was found to be the 
major determinant of a firm’s value. Following from the findings of this study, corporate 
financial decision makers are advised to employ more of long-term-debt than equity capital 
in financing their operations since it results in a positive firm value (Ogbulu & Emeni, 2012). 
Research on capital structure is very thin in the South African context.  Gwatidzo and Ojah 
(2009) is one of the most encompassing studies that have been conducted on African 
markets including South Africa.  This study, looking at Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe, found that companies in these markets tend to follow a modified pecking 
order.  In their study, Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) tested for capital structure dependence on 
asset tangibility, corporate tax, profitability, size and firm age.  Their study found that 
profitability is negatively related to leverage which means that more profitable African firms 
tend to use retained earnings to finance their activities before borrowing.  Tangibility of 
assets was found to be negatively correlated to debt for most of the sampled countries.  It 
was also found that country-specific factors played a role in determining corporate leverage 
with other sample countries using less leverage than South Africa (Gwatidzo & Ojah, 2009).   
2.7 Conclusion 
According to Firer et al (2008) capital structure decisions can have important implications 
for the value of the firm and its cost of capital.  Firms are, however, generally at liberty to 
decide on any capital structure they wish to undertake since the capital structure decision 
can be made independently from the capital investment decision.   
In this section we reviewed the three most predominant capital structure theories, which 
are the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory and the market timing theory.  We also 
briefly reviewed the Modigliani and Miller (1958) Proposition I, which is the capital structure 
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irrelevance theory.  This Proposition states that the value of the levered firm (VL) is equal to 
the value of the unlevered firm (VU). 
To analyse the trade-off theory we reviewed two versions of this theory.  The static trade-
off theory advocated for an optimal level of debt that balances the advantages of adding 
one unit of debt against the cost of adding one unit of debt to the capital structure.  It must, 
however, be of note that this trade-off theory gives little or no indication of how this 
optimal debt-to-equity ratio is calculated. The dynamic trade-off theory on the other hand 
states that firms consider the benefit of adjusting their capital structure against the 
adjustment cost and make debt adjustments only when the benefits are more than the 
costs.  This version recognises that financing frictions make it suboptimal for firms to 
continuously adjust their leverage to the target (Ovtchinnikov, 2010). 
There are other factors such as external economic shocks that may have a significant impact 
on firms with debt levels that are fairly similar even though some of these firms might have 
debt levels that are perceived to be conservative.  A classic example of this is the relatively 
small differences that existed in the leverage ratios of both healthy and distressed firms 
prior to the Asian crisis.  This could indicate that operational factors are at least as 
important as leverage levels when designing an optimal capital structure (Dreyer, 2010).   
According to the pecking order theory, there is a financing hierarchy behaviour in which 
firms tend to first use retained earnings, then cheap debt and only then after move to 
expensive equity to fund their investments.  This theory is centred around adverse selection 
costs based on the superior case of information asymmetry.  An opposing view to the 
pecking order theory states that firms might desire to maintain spare debt or preserve some 
funding capacity by first using debt instead of retained earnings as acclaimed by the pecking 
order theory. 
Under the market timing theory, it is believed that firms tend to issue security when they 
believe that the security is overpriced and repurchase the stock when they believe that it is 
underpriced.  An opposing view to this theory is that firms don’t actually issue securities 
when they are overpriced.  .  One probable reason for this failure to issue stock is that a 
rational investors would almost instantly recognise any attempts to sell off overvalued 
stocks and as a result would reduce the price they are willing to pay for the stock.  This 
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would then imply that it is difficult for firms to time the market as alluded to by the market 
timing theory.  
In this section we also looked at the findings of recent research on the effect of capital 
structure on firm value in different countries.  In Australia it was found that the market 
reacts positively to announcements of financing events that lead to the firm’s capital 
structure moving closer to their relative industry median debt-equity ratio, while for firms 
changing the debt-equity ratios away from the median it lead to either less positive or 
negative abnormal returns. This indicates that the Australian market perceives the industry 
median as an appropriate capital structure benchmark. 
In Pakistan, the results of the research study lead to the conclusion that capital structure 
choice is an important determinant of financial performance of firms in that country.  
In Bangladesh, the findings of their paper suggested that maximizing the wealth of 
shareholders requires a perfect combination of debt and equity, whereas cost of capital has 
a negative correlation in this decision and it has to be as minimal as possible, meaning that 
by changing the capital structure composition a firm can increase its value in the market.  
In China, it was found that managerial ownership does not influence firm value significantly 
when capital structure is added into the equation, however, managerial ownership 
significantly affects capital structure, and capital structure affects corporate performance 
directly. 
In the two Nigerian studies, it was found that, statistically, capital structure is not a major 
determinant of firm performance for manufacturing companies in Nigeria.  The other study 
found that in an emerging economy such as Nigeria, as a component of capital structure, 
equity capital is irrelevant to the value of a firm while Long-term-debt was found to be a 
crucial determinant of a firm’s value. 
Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) carried out a study in this field on African countries including 
South Africa.  In their study they found that a modified pecking order behaviour was 
prevalent in these countries.   
Based on the above literature review, the question still remains on which pattern best 
describes the current situation in South Africa.  Do firms in South Africa follow the modified 
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pecking order theory as previously found by Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009)?  Or will they have 
the same patterns as those found in Nigeria and the other researched countries?  The rest 
of the paper carries out analysis to determine the above. 
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3 Chapter three - Research questions and hypotheses 
3.1 Research hypothesis one: capital structure is irrelevant as per MM1 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), the value of the firm, that is, the stock price, does 
not depend on the capital structure of the firm.  Based on a set of simplifying assumptions 
such as no taxes, no transaction costs and no information asymmetry, this theory indicates 
that the total market value of the financial instruments issued by a firm is given by the risk 
and return of the real assets of the firm.    
According to Firer et al, (2008) capital structure decisions can have important implications 
for the value of the firm and its cost of capital.  Inadequate capital structure decisions can 
lead to a large cost of capital thereby lowering the net present value (NPV) of the firm’s 
investment projects, making the investment projects unacceptable, i.e. the 
underinvestment problem.   
To determine whether capital structure is irrelevant in the South African context, the 
hypothesis will be stated as follows: 
H0: µ ˃ 0.05 (debt-to-equity ratio is not correlated to EPS) 
H1: µ ≤ 0.05 (debt-to-equity ratio is correlated to EPS) 
3.2 Research hypothesis two: does the debt-to-equity ratio differ among 
industries listed on the JSE 
According to the capital structure theory the industry within which a firm belongs is likely to 
have a substantial effect on the observed leverage levels of the individual firms and also 
that with time the firms will tend to converge towards the median industry debt levels.  The 
said convergence towards the industry median debt level is considered as proof that an 
optimal capital structure does exist (Bowen, Daley & Huber, 1982). 
The analysis in this paper will not necessarily test for the above mentioned convergence 
towards the industry median debt levels, but, statistically and practically significant 
differences in the median industry debt levels may be interpreted as support for the optimal 
capital structure theory (Dreyer, 2010). 
To determine the difference between industry debt-to-equity ratio levels descriptive 
statistics will be employed, the hypothesis will be stated as follows: 
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H0: µ1 ≠ µ2 ≠ µ3… µn (industry median debt-to-equity ratios are heterogeneous) 
H1: µ1 = µ2 = µ3…µn (industry median debt-to-equity ratios are homogeneous) 
3.3 Research hypothesis three: is the industry debt-to-equity ratio 
persistent  
Recent literature has proposed that a number of factors impact a firm’s capital structure 
decision and firms do not frequently change their capital structure. This “consistent” 
structure has provoked Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) to support the use of firm 
fixed effect in capital structure regressions. In their research they showed that firm fixed 
effect not only explains 60% of cross-sectional variation in leverage, but also crowds out all 
the known explanatory variables for capital structure (Baranchuk & Xu, 2007).  
In our research paper, we demonstrate that the popular pooled regression approach is less 
biased than the fixed effect model in explaining the cross-sectional variation in leverage. In 
other words, the crowding out phenomenon itself actually implies that the existing 
literature offers useful factors in understanding the capital structures dispersion. This is 
confirmed in our empirical study, where we find that up to 25% of the variations in the long-
term mean can be explained by the known factors. Therefore, given the persistence of 
capital structure, we argue that it is more important to focus our attention on what 
determines the dynamics of capital structure (Baranchuk & Xu, 2007). 
To determine the persistence of the debt-to-equity ratios, the hypothesis will be stated as 
follows: 
H0: µd/ey1 ≠ µd/ey2≠….. (the debt-to-equity ratio is equal over time) 
H1: µd/ey1 = µd/ey2=….. (the debt-to-equity ratio is equal over time) 
3.4 Research hypothesis four: there is a relationship between debt-to-
equity ratio and profitability, size of firm, tax shield and asset 
tangibility 
A study was recently carried out in Istanbul to determine the firm-specific factors that are 
influential on capital structure decisions of 212 industrial firms listed in Istanbul Stock 
Exchange over period 2004 and 2009 with Panel Data Analysis (Basak & Hunkar, 2011).  
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The findings of the above study showed that firm size, liquidity, profitability and sales 
growth affect the leverage ratios of industrials firms significantly. Among these factors, firm 
size and profitability are the most significantly influential factors on capital structures of 
industrial firms, and these two factors are negatively correlated with leverage ratios. 
Growth factor was found to be statistically significant and positively correlated with 
leverage ratios. Liquidity factor is also statically significant but negatively correlated with 
leverage ratios. These findings are consistent with most of the capital structure literature 
and especially support Pecking Order Theory (Basak & Hunkar, 2011). 
To determine factors affecting the debt-to-equity ratio levels, the hypothesis will be stated 
as follows: 
H0: P (ROA, tax shield, market capitalisation, asset tangibility) > 0.05  
H1: P (ROA, tax shield, market capitalisation, asset tangibility) ≤ 0.05  
3.5 Research hypothesis five: is there a difference among industries in 
terms of reliance on long-term debt  
The debt maturity of U.S. industrial firms declined over the past three decades. This decline 
in maturity is mainly driven by the smallest firms for which the median percentage of long-
term debt has decreased from 53% in 1976 to 6% in 2008. For large firms, however, debt 
maturity has not decreased. Information asymmetry plays an important role in explaining 
the decrease in debt maturity, while debt and managerial agency problems do not seem to 
contribute to the decrease (Custódio et al, 2011). 
Interestingly, we show that firms are using more short-term debt regardless of their 
characteristics. This unexpected component of debt maturity is more important than 
changing firm characteristics in explaining the decline in debt maturity and is a result of the 
new firms issuing public equity in the 1980s and 1990s (Custódio et al, 2011).  
To determine the difference between long-term debt ratios, the hypothesis will be stated as 
follows: 
H0: µlong-term debt/total debty1,industry1 ≠ µlong-term debt/total debty2, industry 2≠…..  
H1: µlong-term debt/total debty1,industry1 = µlong-term debt/total debty2, industry 2=…..   
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4 Chapter four - Research data and methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
Research entails the collection and assembling of relevant data and extracting from that 
data relevant findings to support or refute an argument or draw valid conclusions (Dreyer, 
2010; Cameron & Price, 2009).  This section elaborates the data collection process, research 
process and methodology that was employed in answering the research hypotheses 
presented in the previous section (Dreyer, 2010).   
4.2 Population of analysis 
Population can be defined as individuals, groups, organisations, human products and events 
and the conditions to which that population is exposed (Rayan, 2008; Welman & Kruger 
2005).  The population of application for this study is all non-financial services companies 
that are listed on the main board of the JSE Securities Exchange (JSE) for the period 2002 – 
2011 (ten year period). 
4.3 Unit of study 
The unit of study for this research paper is an individual company listed on the JSE for the 
period of ten years from 2002 to 2011.  Variables of interest for the purpose of this study 
are collected on each of these companies.   
4.4 Sampling technique 
The sample may be viewed as a suitability sample as firms are included or excluded based 
on whether they fulfilled the preferred criteria of the study.  Industry analysis are also 
carried out in an effort to detect capital structure differences between industries, therefore, 
the sample may be regarded as stratified and because the number of firms in each industry 
are unequal this is a disproportional stratified sample (Dreye, 2010; Zikmund, 2003). 
There are a few of data exclusions that included: 
AltX listed companies: There are significant differences between the AltX and JSE listing 
requirements which makes the calibre of companies listing in the respective exchanges 
vastly different. 
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Financial services companies: These are excluded because their capital structure is different 
from that of a non-financial firm.  Their capital structure, sources and allocation of funds are 
regulated with regulations such as the capital adequacy ratio and the reserve requirement. 
Other exclusions included firms who did not have data covering the observed period. 
After all the above exclusions, the sample for this study has 65 firms. 
4.5 Data collection  
For the purpose of this study, only secondary data was employed.  The primary source of 
the data employed for the study was Bloomberg because it was the preferred all-
encompassing data base for global information. 
Panel data was employed for the purposes of this research study because of its advantages.  
A panel data set provides more observations leading to larger sample status.  The central 
limit theorem may apply where single dimensional single dimensional time series or cross-
sectional data sets fails making estimation and inference more efficient (Wang, 2009). 
According to Wooldridge (2002), it allows for control of unobserved cross-section 
heterogeneity.   
4.6 Data analysis  
Quantitative analysis has become an increasingly important way of analysing financial data.  
Quantitative techniques are now regarded as an effective way of providing solutions to 
management problems (Richard, 1992).  The data analysis process employed the data 
analysis techniques discussed below: 
4.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics convert data into a format that is easier to analyse, interpret and 
understand (Zikmund, 2003).   
Below is an indication of how descriptive statistics can be employed according to Pallant 
(2009). 
 A description of the characteristics that make up the sample 
 A check of whether the variables are compliant with the techniques to be used in 
answering the research questions 
 Descriptive statistics can also be used to address the research questions 
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The descriptive statistics that are covered in this study are: 
4.6.1.1 Measures of central tendency  
 The sample mean 
The sample mean which is calculated as the sum of all data observations divided by 
the number of the observations, is widely known as the arithmetic average of the 
sample or observations. 
 The median 
The median of a data set is the observation in the middle of the data.  If the data set 
has an equal number of observations, then the median is calculated by averaging the 
two middle observations. 
4.6.1.2 Measures of dispersion 
 The minimum, maximum and the range 
The minimum is the smallest observation in a data set and the maximum is the 
biggest value in a data set.  The difference between the smallest and largest 
observations is called the range. 
4.6.1.3 Measures of variability 
 Variance  
Variance is calculated at the average of the squared deviations from the mean of a 
data set. 
 Standard deviation 
The standard deviation of a data set is the square root of the variance of the data 
set.   
4.6.2 Regression analysis 
According to Sykes (2003) a regression analysis is a statistical tool that is used for the 
investigation of relationships between variables where the investigator assembles data on 
the underlying variables of interest and employs regression to estimate the quantitative 
effects of the causal variables upon the variable that they influence. As explicitly stated 
among the study objectives and hypothesis, part of this study sought to establish whether 
the capital structure is irrelevant as per MM I and the factors that determine the debt - 
equity structure divide. To effectively and efficiently achieve these objectives, a 
parsimonious panel data regression analysis was adopted  
  34 
4.6.2.1 The Panel Data regression model 
 The extant literature on panel data analysis submits that generally, as in this case, data can 
form a panel that is tenable for panel data modelling and analysis when it is formed out of 
observations pooled across different individuals, countries, companies, households, etc. and 
also over several time periods. To test the MM I proposition and unravel the key 
determinants of a firms capital structure, data was collected on different variables for each 
company from 2002 to 2011 for 65 companies.  The desire for parsimony required that only 
a few variables were included in the model, yet,  according to Koops (2006) a poorly 
specified model runs into the risk of misspecification and spurious or meaningless 
regression. To mitigate such an unfavourable likelihood, we adopted a panel data regression 
methodology that is acclaimed for being able to control for individual heterogeneity which 
helps to account for missing variables and reduce the possibility of multicollinearity that is 
prevalent in time series data Baltagi (2005).  A basic representation of the study model can 
be shown as:  
           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
In the model above,   represents the dependent variable and   denotes a vector of 
explanatory variables. In addition,   is a vector of explanatory variables’ coefficients,   is the 
error term,   is the individual company subscript while   is the time subscript. In the first 
case, this model is used to represent a model that seeks to estimate whether firm’s 
performance, which is proxied by EPS, has a significant relationship with debt-to-equity 
ratio, corporate tax shield ratio and asset tangibility. Consequently,   denotes a vector of 
debt-to-equity ratio, corporate tax shield ratio and asset tangibility whereas   represents 
the firm’s performance. As can be seen, very few variables are included on the right hand 
side of equation (4), this means that the error term will not meet the classic least square 
orthogonality requirements since effects of variables not covered in the study will all be 
captured by     . Fortunately, the panel literature advises that     can be decomposed into 
company specific effects and a pure error term. Specifically,  
                                                                                                                                                         
   is called the individual specific effect which captures unobserved company-specific 
effects while     are pure errors that are independent and identically distributed with a 
mean of zero and a constant variance. Assuming further that    is a fixed parameter for 
every company, independent of the     for all    and   but highly correlated to    , then the 
new model formed is often called a fixed effect model (FEM). In particular, 
           
                                                                                                                               
It’s common for such a model to be estimated using dummy variables technique to 
represent each company so that the intercept can vary between companies. This method is 
popularly known as least square dummy variable (LSDV) approach.  According to Gujarati 
(2003), the number of dummies to be introduced will be equal to the number of companies 
less one, that is, only 64 dummies will be used. 
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Where:  
    = earnings per share of firm    in time   (proxy for firm value)  
 
 
 
  = the debt-equity ratio of firm    in time   (proxy for capital structure) 
    = the tax shield which is the tax to net income ratio of firm    in time   
    = the asset tangibility which is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets of firm    in time   
In our second case, the above model can be specified as: 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Where: 
 
 
 = the debt-equity ratio of firm    in time   (proxy for capital structure) 
Size = the market cap of firm    in time   
Prof = the return on asset of firm    in time   (proxy for profitability) 
TS = is the tax shield which is the tax to net income ratio of firm    in time   
AT = the asset tangibility which is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets of firm    in time   
4.6.3 Defining the dependent variables 
For the purposes of addressing the research questions set out in this paper the dependent 
variables are as follows: 
 Earnings per share (EPS): EPS is net profit/earnings expressed on a per share basis.  
For the purposes of this study, EPS will be used as a proxy for firm value. 
 Debt-to-Equity (D/E): For the purposes of this study, the D/E ratio will be used as a 
proxy for the capital structure of a firm. 
4.6.4 Defining the explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables for the model use in this study are as follows: 
 Debt-to-Equity (D/E): For the purposes of this study, the D/E ratio will be used as a 
proxy for the capital structure of a firm. 
 Tax Shield: For the purposes of this study, the tax shield will be expressed as a ratio 
of tax paid to net income. 
 Size: ratio of market capitalization of the firm to the total industry capitalization  
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 Profitability: Return on Assets (ROA) will be used as a proxy for profitability in our 
model. 
 Asset tangibility: For the purpose of this study, asset tangibility will be calculated as 
a ratio of fixed assets to total assets. 
4.6.5 Hypothesis testing process 
Theoretical hypothesis may be accepted or rejected by the application of appropriate 
statistical techniques to empirically observed data (Zikmund, 2003).   
The process followed for hypothesis testing is as follows: 
 Define the null hypothesis (H0) 
 Define the alternative hypothesis (H1) 
 Define the level of significance (α) 
o The level of significance establishes the level that is considered too low to 
support the null hypothesis.  (α = 0.05/95%) 
 Reject or accept the null hypothesis based on the level of significance 
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5 Chapter five - Presentation and analysis of results 
5.1 Introduction 
The results and findings are outlined in this section with inferences drawn from the 
hypotheses in the previous section of this paper as follows:  
 A presentation of the descriptive statistics of all firms in the sample for the study  
 Unit root test results    
 The descriptive statistics results 
 Regression results for research hypothesis one 
 Results for research hypothesis two 
 Research hypothesis three  
 Regression results for research hypothesis four   
5.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
Note that the Oil&Gas and Telecommunications industries were excluded when running the 
regression because they only had one and two firms, respectively, that met the sample 
selection specifications. 
From Table 1 below, several measures of central tendency and dispersion were computed 
to depict the underlying distribution of each variable.  The key highlights of the table are as 
follows:  
 EPS had an overall average of about 3.84% for all 65 companies and a median of 1.96%.  
 The debt-to-equity ratio had a mean of 50.17%, a median of 28.98% and a relatively high 
standard deviation of 71.03%.  
 As can be seen the two variables, which forms the two main dependent variables adopted 
for this study, exhibit a distribution close to normality although they are extremely 
dispersed. 
The other variables whose descriptive statistics were computed are shown in table 1 below.  
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Table 1: ALL INDUSTRIES POOLED – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 AT D2E EPS MCAP PE ROA TS 
 Mean 48.84 50.17 3.84 9.23 14.29 11.46 36.21 
 Median 39.55 28.98 1.96 3.25 11.51 9.40 45.08 
 Maximum 632.40 582.71 54.52 75.90 265.94 512.28 274.14 
 Minimum 0.00 0.00 -8.22 0.00 0.02 -45.60 -3,257.14 
 Std. Dev. 38.72 71.03 5.46 15.01 17.45 21.52 137.83 
 
5.1.2 Unit root test 
A variable is said to have unit root when it is explosive.  According to existing literature on 
unit root tests, a variable can only be included in a model when it does not have unit root or 
is stationary.  Since most financial series have an underlying growth rate, their mean and/or 
variance are continually increasing which will lead to spurious regression results if they are 
included in regression models without eliminating such non-stationarity. 
Several methods of testing panel data unit root exist, but the Levin, Lin & Chu (2002) test 
was adopted for this study.  The results of this test are given below. 
According to the results in Table 2 below, all variables exhibited stationarity and unit root 
was non-existent and were all suitable to include in the regression analysis. 
Table 2: UNIT ROOT TEST 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
Balanced observations for each test   
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
AT -325.366  0.0000  65  520 
Debt-to-Equity Ratio -5.66143  0.0000  65  520 
EPS -4.34689  0.0000  65  520 
PE -12.4399  0.0000  65  520 
TS -215.158  0.0000  65  520 
ROA -17.2426  0.0000  65  519 
Market Capitalization Ratio -12.6915  0.0000  65  520 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
     
     
     
Note: EPS stands for Earnings Per Share, PE stands for price per earnings ratio, TS stands for tax shield ratio,  
AT stands for asset tangibility ratio, ROA stands for return on assets 
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5.2 Research hypothesis one: capital structure is irrelevant as per MM1 
The results for the pooled companies across industries show that none of the explanatory 
variables were significant at the 5% level of significance. However, asset tangibility showed 
significance at the 10% level.  The debt-to-equity ratios of South African firms sampled in 
this study were insignificant in this model, which means that they had no explanatory power 
on EPS (firm value). 
The overall fit of the model shown by the R squared stood at 0.6 or 60% which indicates that 
the model can explain 60% of the variance in the EPS (firm value).  This is supported by a 
significant F-statistic at 5% level. 
Table 3: FEM REGRESSION OF ALL COMPANIES - FIRM VALUE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: EPS   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 65   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 650  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 4.451460 0.387097 11.49959  0.0000 
D2E -0.002138 0.002996 -0.713499 0.4758 
TS 0.001515 0.001110 1.365001 0.1728 
AT -0.011029 0.006351 -1.736578 0.0830 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.595398    Mean dependent var 3.860712 
Adjusted R-squared 0.548820    S.D. dependent var 5.475059 
S.E. of regression 3.677593    Akaike info criterion 5.541123 
Sum squared resid 7871.369    Schwarz criterion 6.009483 
Log likelihood -1732.865    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.722788 
F-statistic 12.78285    Durbin-Watson stat 1.078609 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, D2E stands for debt-to-equity ratio, TS stands for tax shield ratio, AT stands for 
asset tangibility ratio, S.E stands for standard error, S.D is the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
 
5.2.1 The irrelevance of capital structure in some of the industries sampled in 
the study 
 
5.2.1.1 Industrials 
The results for the industrials companies depicted below indicates that asset tangibility is 
the only significant variable at the 5% level of significance, however, the tax shield was 
found to be significant at the 10% level of significance.  As in the previous results, the debt-
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to-equity ratios of firms in the Industrials industry were insignificant meaning that they had 
no explanatory power on the dependent variable EPS. 
The R squared was significant at the 5% level and revealed that the model explains 63% of 
the variance in EPS (firm value).   
Table 4: FEM REGRESSION OF INDUSTRIAL COMPANIES - FIRM VALUE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: EPS   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 18   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 180  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 6.963874 0.884506 7.873177 0.0000 
D2E 0.000194 0.003570 0.054303 0.9568 
TS 0.001590 0.000847 1.877088 0.0623 
AT -0.068269 0.023086 -2.957164 0.0036 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.625761    Mean dependent var 4.463009 
Adjusted R-squared 0.578687    S.D. dependent var 4.162982 
S.E. of regression 2.702134    Akaike info criterion 4.935242 
Sum squared resid 1160.943    Schwarz criterion 5.307753 
Log likelihood -423.1717    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.086279 
F-statistic 13.29312    Durbin-Watson stat 0.807361 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, D2E stands for debt-to-equity ratio, TS stands for tax shield ratio, AT stands for 
asset tangibility ratio, S.E stands for standard error, S.D is the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
 
5.2.1.2  Basic materials 
The basic materials like the industrials results, show that only asset tangibility is significant 
at the 5% level of significance.  The debt-to-equity and tax shield are not significant. This 
means that the debt-to-equity ratios of firms in the Basic materials industry had no 
explanatory power over the dependent variable.  
The R squared was significant at the at the 5% significance level revealing that 53% of the 
variance in EPS (firm value) is explained by the model.   
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Table 5: FEM REGRESSION OF BASIC MATERIALS COMPANIES - FIRM VALUE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: EPS   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 12   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 120  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 15.62170 4.001696 3.903768 0.0002 
D2E -0.045150 0.044473 -1.015218 0.3123 
TS 0.006028 0.017290 0.348669 0.7280 
AT -0.105043 0.049307 -2.130406 0.0355 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.538854    Mean dependent var 6.229901 
Adjusted R-squared 0.477368    S.D. dependent var 10.03394 
S.E. of regression 7.253866    Akaike info criterion 6.917415 
Sum squared resid 5524.950    Schwarz criterion 7.265851 
Log likelihood -400.0449    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.058916 
F-statistic 8.763828    Durbin-Watson stat 1.185977 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, D2E stands for debt-to-equity ratio, TS stands for tax shield ratio, AT stands for 
asset tangibility ratio, S.E stands for standard error, S.D is the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
 
5.2.1.3 Consumer Services 
The results for Consumer services also show that asset tangibility was the only significant 
variable at the 5% significance level.  Once again the debt-to-equity ratio is insignificant 
which means that the debt-to-equity ratios of firms in the Consumer services have no effect 
on their firm value. 
The R squared was significant at the 5% significance level and showed that the model 
explained 65% of the variation in EPS (firm value). 
 
 
 
 
 
  42 
Table 6: FEM REGRESSION OF CONSUMER SERVICES COMPANIES - FIRM VALUE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: EPS   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 17   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 170  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 4.926782 0.931943 5.286572 0.0000 
D2E 0.000183 0.003172 0.057712 0.9541 
TS -0.003598 0.005218 -0.689529 0.4916 
AT -0.044045 0.020753 -2.122396 0.0354 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.647460    Mean dependent var 2.884656 
Adjusted R-squared 0.602805    S.D. dependent var 2.654892 
S.E. of regression 1.673203    Akaike info criterion 3.977488 
Sum squared resid 419.9414    Schwarz criterion 4.346405 
Log likelihood -318.0865    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.127190 
F-statistic 14.49915    Durbin-Watson stat 0.569593 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, D2E stands for debt-to-equity ratio, TS stands for tax shield ratio, AT stands for 
asset tangibility ratio, S.E stands for standard error, S.D is the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
 
5.2.1.4  Consumer goods 
The results for Consumer goods like the previous industries show that only asset tangibility 
was significant at the 5% level of significance.  This means that the debt-to-equity ratios of 
these firms did not have explanatory power over the dependent variable. 
The R squared was significant at the 5% significance level and showed that the model 
explains 83% of the variation in EPS (firm value). 
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Table 7: FEM REGRESSION OF CONSUMER GOODS COMPANIES - FIRM VALUE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: EPS   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 11   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 110  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.100045 1.272217 0.864668 0.3894 
D2E -0.003253 0.005113 -0.636205 0.5262 
TS -0.002381 0.002751 -0.865349 0.3890 
AT 0.047942 0.023476 2.042156 0.0439 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.831334    Mean dependent var 3.332155 
Adjusted R-squared 0.808494    S.D. dependent var 3.915189 
S.E. of regression 1.713343    Akaike info criterion 4.033184 
Sum squared resid 281.8124    Schwarz criterion 4.376881 
Log likelihood -207.8251    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.172589 
F-statistic 36.39780    Durbin-Watson stat 0.892084 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, D2E stands for debt-to-equity ratio, TS stands for tax shield ratio, AT stands for 
asset tangibility ratio, S.E stands for standard error, S.D is the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
 
5.2.1.5 Health care 
According to the Health care regression results, tax shield was the only significant variable at 
the 5% level of significance.  Once again the debt-to-equity ratios of firms within this 
industry have no statistical effect on firm value. 
The R squared was significant at the 5% significance level indicating that the model explains 
56% of the variation in EPS (firm value). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  44 
Table 8: FEM REGRESSION OF HEALTH CARE COMPANIES - FIRM VALUE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: EPS   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 3   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 30  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 2.805106 0.593117 4.729431 0.0001 
D2E 0.000402 0.001673 0.240129 0.8123 
TS -0.026596 0.009360 -2.841362 0.0090 
AT -0.001995 0.002149 -0.928016 0.3626 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.556607    Mean dependent var 1.634580 
Adjusted R-squared 0.464233    S.D. dependent var 1.512952 
S.E. of regression 1.107422    Akaike info criterion 3.218802 
Sum squared resid 29.43318    Schwarz criterion 3.499042 
Log likelihood -42.28204    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.308453 
F-statistic 6.025608    Durbin-Watson stat 0.595468 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000952    
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, D2E stands for debt-to-equity ratio, TS stands for tax shield ratio, AT stands for 
asset tangibility ratio, S.E stands for standard error, S.D is the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
 
5.2.1.6 Technology 
The results for the Technology industry show that asset tangibility was the only variable that 
was significant at the 5% significance level.  The debt-to-equity ratio was insignificant 
meaning that it had no statistical effect on firm value. 
The R squared was significant at the 5% significance level and showed that the model 
explained 47% of the variation in EPS (firm value). 
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Table 9: FEM REGRESSION OF TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES - FIRM VALUE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: EPS   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 4   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 40  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1.733536 0.909980 -1.905028 0.0655 
D2E 0.001082 0.015802 0.068483 0.9458 
TS -0.005117 0.006036 -0.847837 0.4026 
AT 0.191378 0.056131 3.409503 0.0017 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.468932    Mean dependent var 1.314178 
Adjusted R-squared 0.372374    S.D. dependent var 1.629320 
S.E. of regression 1.290794    Akaike info criterion 3.506020 
Sum squared resid 54.98292    Schwarz criterion 3.801574 
Log likelihood -63.12040    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.612883 
F-statistic 4.856481    Durbin-Watson stat 1.805290 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001181    
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, D2E stands for debt-to-equity ratio, TS stands for tax shield ratio, AT stands for 
asset tangibility ratio, S.E stands for standard error, S.D is the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
 
5.2.2 Summary of results 
According to the results for the effect of capital structure on firm value above, the debt-to-
equity ratio has no explanatory power over EPS (proxy for firm value).  This means that 
there is no statistical relationship between firm value and the capital structure of firms in 
the South African context.   
These results are inconsistent with expectations as previous research in the South African 
context established correlation between EPS and debt-to-equity ratio.  Rayan (2008) found 
that there is a significant negative correlation between EPS and debt-to-equity ratio at the 
95% significance level.  However, as above, Rayan (2008) found no significant correlation 
between EPS and debt-to-equity for the Basic materials, Consumer goods, Health care, 
Industrials and Technology industries. 
The value of a firm is equal to its equity value.  Because firms are traded on the market, 
their value equals their “market value of equity” which is essentially their market 
capitalisation.  Market capitalisation of a firm is the firm’s share price multiplied by the 
firm’s number of outstanding shares. Being traded on the market also exposes firm value to 
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systematic or market effects.  These systematic effects affect all firms each to a greater or 
lesser extent.  The value of the firm is also affected by idiosyncratic or unsystematic effects 
which are unique to each firm. 
To ensure robustness of our model we re-specified the model and increased the number of 
firms in the sample to 82 firms.  To strip out the systematic and idiosyncratic effects on firm 
value we included the Top 40 All share Index (Alsi40) and Earnings Before Interest, Tax, 
Depreciation and Amortisation (EBITDA) as control variables for systematic and idiosyncratic 
effects respectively.  Although gearing (debt-to-equity) is also an idiosyncratic effect, for the 
purpose of this study it will be treated as an independent variable in our model. 
            
 
   
                                                                               
Where: 
      = market capitalisation of firm     in time   (proxy for firm value) 
 
 
 = the debt-equity ratio of firm    in time   (proxy for capital structure) 
       = top 40 all share index (proxy for systematic/market effects) 
       = earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation of firm    in time   
(proxy for idiosyncratic/unsystematic effects) 
 
The results of the re-specified model are presented below starting with the unit root test: 
According to the results in Table 10 below, all variables in the re-specified model exhibited 
stationarity and unit root was non-existent.  This means that all these variables were 
suitable for inclusion in the regression analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  47 
Table 10: UNIT ROOT TEST (RE-SPECIFIED MODEL) 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
User specified lags at: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
Balanced observations for each test 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
ALSI40 -7.56325  0.0000  82  653 
DEBT_EQUITY -17.9186  0.0000  82  641 
EBITDA -10.0099  0.0000  82  641 
MKT_CAP -6.58019  0.0000  82  653 
     
     
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
To determine the relationship between firm value and capital structure, the Fixed Effect 
Model (FEM), Random Effect Model (REM) and the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares models 
were used for our panel data analysis.  The most appropriate model is determined by the 
structure of the composite error term and the correlation between components of the error 
term and the observed explanatory variables (Gwatidzo & Ojah, 2009).  Because the cross-
section used for the purposes of this study is exhaustive in nature, FEM is probably the most 
appropriate model.  The F-test and Hausman test were carried out to compare FEM and 
REM outcomes and the FEM was found to be the appropriate model to use. 
 
The results of the pooled companies across all industries show that debt-to-equity is 
insignificant at the 5% level of significance, which means that debt-to-equity ratio (proxy for 
capital structure) has no explanatory power on market capitalisation (proxy for firm value).  
However, the two control variables, ALSI40 and EBITDA were both significant at the 5% 
significance level which meaning that they have explanatory power on market capitalisation 
(proxy for firm value).   
The overall fit of the model shown by the R squared stood at 0.73 or 73% indicating that the 
model explains 73% of the variation in market capitalisation (firm value).  This is supported 
by a significant F-statistic at 5% level of significance. 
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Table 11: FEM REGRESSION OF ALL COMPANIES - FIRM VALUE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: MKT_CAP   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 82   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 813  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -3.66E+09 4.13E+09 -0.886679 0.3755 
DEBT_EQUITY -3.57E+08 5.69E+08 -0.627068 0.5308 
ALSI40 901929.7 197719.3 4.561669 0.0000 
EBITDA 6113.164 386.0488 15.83521 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.732780    Mean dependent var 3.06E+10 
Adjusted R-squared 0.701947    S.D. dependent var 7.39E+10 
S.E. of regression 4.04E+10    Akaike info criterion 51.77879 
Sum squared resid 1.19E+24    Schwarz criterion 52.27025 
Log likelihood -20963.08    Hannan-Quinn criter. 51.96744 
F-statistic 23.76607    Durbin-Watson stat 1.117615 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, DEBT_EQUITY stands for debt-to-equity ratio, ALSI40 stands for Top 40 all share 
index, EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, S.E stands for standard error, S.D is 
the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
 
The results of the REM and pooled ordinary least squares models are in Appendix A, Table  
A1 and Table A2. 
 
Further analysis of the MM I were carried out on the data by segregating the data by market 
capitalisation into large, medium and small firms.  The year 2007 was selected as the base 
year for the selection of firms and firms with a market capitalisation of over R50 billion were 
classified as large firms, between R50 billion and R10 billion were classified as medium firms 
and all the firms with a market capitalisation of below R10 billion were classified as small 
firms.   
The results of the regressions on large firms in Table 12 below indicated that debt-to-equity 
ratio is insignificant at the 5% level of significance meaning that even for large firms the 
capital structure has no explanatory power over firm value.  As with the results of the 
regression on all companies, the two control variables were significant at the 5% level of 
significance. 
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According to the R squared of 0.83, the model explained 83% of the variation in firm value 
of large firms and this is supported by a significant F-statistic at the 5% level of significance. 
Table 12: FEM REGRESSION OF LARGE FIRMS - FIRM VALUE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: MKT_CAP   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 14   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 140  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1.51E+10 1.70E+10 -0.886430 0.3771 
DEBT_EQUITY 2.98E+09 8.34E+09 0.356941 0.7217 
ALSI40 6199926. 790222.1 7.845802 0.0000 
EBITDA 2387.307 739.6243 3.227729 0.0016 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.832195    Mean dependent var 1.34E+11 
Adjusted R-squared 0.810367    S.D. dependent var 1.32E+11 
S.E. of regression 5.76E+10    Akaike info criterion 52.50400 
Sum squared resid 4.08E+23    Schwarz criterion 52.86120 
Log likelihood -3658.280    Hannan-Quinn criter. 52.64915 
F-statistic 38.12474    Durbin-Watson stat 0.756377 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, DEBT_EQUITY stands for debt-to-equity ratio, ALSI40 stands for Top 40 all share 
index, EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, S.E stands for standard error, S.D is 
the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
 
 
The results of the REM and pooled ordinary least squares models are in Appendix A, Table 
A3 and Table A4. 
According to the regression results for the medium firms, debt-to-equity has no explanatory 
power over market capitalisation of medium size firm values.  Debt-to-equity was found to 
be insignificant at the 5% level of significance while ALSI40 and EBITDA were both significant 
at the 5% level of significance. 
The model explains 71% of the variation in firm value of medium firms and this is supported 
by a significant F-statistic at the 5% level of significance.  
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Table 13: FEM REGRESSION OF MEDIUM FIRMS - FIRM VALUE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: MKT_CAP   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 26   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 260  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -2.92E+08 1.23E+09 -0.237689 0.8123 
DEBT_EQUITY -76079960 1.14E+08 -0.667469 0.5051 
ALSI40 759995.5 65950.82 11.52367 0.0000 
EBITDA 1410.480 324.1809 4.350904 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.708183    Mean dependent var 1.77E+10 
Adjusted R-squared 0.672812    S.D. dependent var 1.20E+10 
S.E. of regression 6.87E+09    Akaike info criterion 48.24467 
Sum squared resid 1.09E+22    Schwarz criterion 48.64183 
Log likelihood -6242.808    Hannan-Quinn criter. 48.40434 
F-statistic 20.02118    Durbin-Watson stat 0.854069 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, DEBT_EQUITY stands for debt-to-equity ratio, ALSI40 stands for Top 40 all share 
index, EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, S.E stands for standard error, S.D is 
the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
 
The results of the REM and pooled ordinary least squares models are in Appendix A, Table 
A5 and Table A6. 
The regression results for small firms presented in Table 14 below show that even for small 
firms the debt-to-equity ratio has no explanatory power over firm value.  The two control 
variables were found to be significant at the 5% level of significance for small firms as well. 
The overall fit of the model shown by the R squared stood at 0.76 indicating that 76% of the 
variation in firm value for small is explained by the model.   
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Table 14: FEM REGRESSION OF SMALL FIRMS - FIRM VALUE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: MKT_CAP   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 42   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 416  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -2.08E+08 2.45E+08 -0.847309 0.3974 
DEBT_EQUITY -37849379 43908164 -0.862012 0.3892 
ALSI40 149148.2 12338.50 12.08804 0.0000 
EBITDA 1159.603 221.5937 5.233012 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.761047    Mean dependent var 3.29E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.732708    S.D. dependent var 3.26E+09 
S.E. of regression 1.69E+09    Akaike info criterion 45.43027 
Sum squared resid 1.05E+21    Schwarz criterion 45.86629 
Log likelihood -9404.497    Hannan-Quinn criter. 45.60267 
F-statistic 26.85469    Durbin-Watson stat 0.828664 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, DEBT_EQUITY stands for debt-to-equity ratio, ALSI40 stands for Top 40 all share 
index, EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, S.E stands for standard error, S.D is 
the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
 
 
The results of the REM and pooled ordinary least squares models are in Appendix A, Table 
A7 and Table A8.   
As with the results of the initial model, the re-specified model indicate that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between firm value and the capital structure of a firm in 
the South African context even when other idiosyncratic and systematic effects have been 
stripped out.   
We therefore accept the null hypothesis and conclude that the debt-to-equity ratio is 
insignificant at the 5% level of significance, meaning that as according to MM I, the capital 
structure of a firm has no effect on firm value in the South African context. 
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5.3 Research hypothesis two: does the debt-to-equity ratio differ among 
industries listed on the JSE 
Table 15: DEBT-TO-EQUITY RATIOS BY INDUSTRY 
Ratio (%) Industrials Basic 
materials 
Consumer 
services 
Consumer 
goods 
Telecoms Health 
care 
Technology Oil&Gas 
2002/12/31 63 41 31 44 49 30 15 42 
2003/12/31 69 43 29 34 38 32 15 26 
2004/12/31 61 63 36 33 26 43 13 29 
2005/12/30 71 52 30 41 29 53 32 34 
2006/12/29 85 45 29 38 37 194 14 31 
2007/12/31 80 36 53 48 41 210 19 25 
2008/12/31 78 37 40 61 42 278 18 21 
2009/12/31 75 37 35 43 34 238 10 15 
2010/12/31 70 32 32 54 31 228 17 13 
2011/12/30 69 29 32 44 38 214 38 10 
Average ratio 72 42 35 44 37 152 19 25 
 
The table above presents the different debt-to-equity structures per industry.  According to 
the table above, the Health care industry had the highest levels of debt-to-equity followed 
by the Industrials sector.  The Technology industry had the lowest levels of the debt-to-
equity ratio over the observed period.   
The average market capitalisation of the Health care industry was 33.3% as compared to an 
average of 25% for the Technology industry over the observed period.  This is consistent 
with the results of previous studies.  Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) found that large South 
African and Zimbabwean firms tended to use more debt than their small counterparts.   
Kurshev and Strebulaev (2005), also established that large firms in the United States tend to 
have higher leverage ratios than smaller firms.  
According to the results presented in the table above, we can conclude that the debt-to-
equity ratios of the different industries sampled for this study are heterogeneous, therefore, 
we accept the null hypothesis.   
5.4 Research hypothesis three: is the industry debt-to-equity ratio 
persistent 
The results presented graphically below depict the persistence of the different debt-to-
equity structures within the different industries over the observed 10 year period.   
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5.4.1 Results presentation 
 
Figure 6: DEBT-TO-EQUITY_OIL&GAS 
The Oil&Gas industry only has one company of the JSE being Sasol Limited (“Sasol”).  Over 
the observed period Sasol’s debt-to-equity ratio has drastically declined from just over 40% 
in 2002 to 10% by the end of 2011.  
Figure 7: DEBT-TO-EQUITY_TECHNOLOGY 
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The debt-to-equity structure of firms within the technology industry has varied over time 
within the observed period.  There has, however, been a sharp persistent increase in the 
debt-to-equity ratio from 2009 to 2011. 
Figure 8: DEBT-TO-EQUITY_ HEALTH CARE 
As shown in the figure above, the health care industry is highly leveraged.  The firms within 
the health care industry relied heavily on debt with their debt levels aggressively increasing 
from 2005 to 2008.  These debt-to-equity levels are higher than of all the other industries 
represented in this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: DEBT-TO-EQUITY_TELECOMMS 
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The debt-to-equity ratio for the telecommunications industry declined sharply from about 
49% in 2002 to just below 30% in 2004.  From 2004, the diagram shows a gradual increase 
that fell slightly around 2008 and moderately increasing again in 2010. 
Figure 10: DEBT-TO-EQUITY_CONSUMER GOODS 
The consumer goods industry shows a variable pattern in the debt-to-equity ratio.  The 
debt-to-equity ratios of firms in the consumer goods industry show a structure that is range 
bound between 30% and 60% over the observed period. 
Figure 11: DEBT-TO-EQUITY_CONSUMER SERVICES 
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The consumer services industry show a range bound structure, however, there was a sharp 
increase in the structure from 2006.  The sharp increase fell in 2007 to restore the persistent 
range.   
Figure 12: DEBT-TO-EQUITY_BASIC MATERIALS 
The debt-to-equity ratio of the basic materials industry went down from just over 60% in 
2004 to below 30% in 2011.  The figure shows a persistent decline between 2004 and 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: DEBT-TO-EQUITY_INDUSTRIAL 
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The debt-to-equity ratio in the industrial industry was persistently above 60% over the 
observed period.  The ratio increased to between 80 % and 90% in 2006 and gradually 
declined to just below 70% where it levelled for the rest of the observed period. 
5.4.2 Summary of results   
The results presented above indicate that there is a vast difference with regards to the 
capital structure of different industries.  The capital structure does not only vary but the 
persistence patterns are also different.   
Sasol, which represents the Oil & Gas industry in this study, had very low levels of debt-to-
equity ratios.  These levels were predominantly below 40% throughout the observed period.  
The debt-to-equity levels of technology firms are variable and moderate over the observed 
period.  There was, however, a sharp increase in levels from a little under 15% to a little 
over 30% in 2004.  Another jump in the levels was from 15% in 2010 to levels of just below 
40% in 2011. 
The debt-to-equity ratios of firms in the Health industry are higher than those of all the 
other sectors sampled in this study.  The Health industry levels are a serious outlier of the 
sample.  The Health industry firms broke the 100% level around 2005 and peaked at 250% in 
2010.  The levels have, however, fallen moderately from the peak levels.  The 
Telecommunications firms had very moderate levels of debt-to-equity throughout the 
observed period.  The levels fell sharply from 50% in 2002 to just below 30% in 2004 and 
remained below the 40% level for the rest of the period. 
The Consumer goods levels of debt-to-equity had a persistent range bound pattern over the 
observed period.  The levels ranged between 30% and 60%.  The Consumer services industry 
also had range bound levels.  The upper range of firms in the Consumer services was, 
however, lower than that of the Consumer goods firms at 50%.  The Consumer services 
range also had a sharp increase of levels from 30% to a little over 50% between 2006 and 
2007 but they fell back to the 30% levels for the rest of the period. 
The Basic materials industry had a very wide range of debt-to-equity levels.  Their levels fell 
from a little over 60% in 2004 to levels of a little under 30% in 2011.  Industrials were 
second after the Health industry with debt-to-equity levels ranging between 60% and 85% 
over the observed period.  
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The results above show that the debt-to-equity levels among the different industries 
sampled in this study are heterogeneous, therefore, we accept the null hypothesis. 
5.5 Research hypothesis four: there is a relationship between debt-to-
equity ratio and profitability, size, asset tangibility and tax shield 
According to the regression results presented below, return on assets and asset tangibility 
were the only two variables in the model that were significant, meaning that they have 
explanatory power over the dependent variable debt-to-equity ratio (proxy for capital 
structure).  The R squared was significant at the 5% significance level, with the model 
explaining 54% of the variation in the capital structure of firms sampled in this study. 
Table 16: FEM REGRESSION OF ALL COMPANIES AND INDUSTRIES - CAPITAL STRUCTURE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: D2E   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 65   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 650  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 68.56153 6.892333 9.947508 0.0000 
MCAP -0.574213 0.492695 -1.165453 0.2443 
ROA -0.226823 0.101865 -2.226697 0.0264 
TS 0.001885 0.015285 0.123351 0.9019 
AT -0.215968 0.087574 -2.466129 0.0139 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.544307    Mean dependent var 50.18922 
Adjusted R-squared 0.490972    S.D. dependent var 70.97957 
S.E. of regression 50.64120    Akaike info criterion 10.78749 
Sum squared resid 1489993.    Schwarz criterion 11.26274 
Log likelihood -3436.936    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.97183 
F-statistic 10.20559    Durbin-Watson stat 0.910026 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, D2E stands for debt-to-equity ratio, MCAP stands for market capitalisation, ROA 
stands for return on asset,  TS stands for tax shield ratio, AT stands for asset tangibility ratio,  S.E stands for standard error, 
S.D is the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
 
5.5.1 The variables that affect the capital structure of some of the industries 
sampled in this study 
5.5.1.1 Industrials 
According to the Industrials results below, return on asset was the only variable that was 
significant at the 5% level of significance.  Market capitalisation, tax shield and asset 
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tangibility were all insignificant meaning that they did not have explanatory power over the 
Industrial firms’ capital structure. 
The R square was significant at the 5% level of significance and indicated that the model 
explained 44% of the variation in the Industrial firms’ capital structure.  
Table 17: FEM REGRESSION OF INDUSTRIALS COMPANIES - CAPITAL STRUCTURE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: D2E   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 18   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 180  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 63.52329 24.12477 2.633115 0.0093 
MCAP -1.005274 2.144806 -0.468702 0.6399 
ROA -1.737170 0.612976 -2.833994 0.0052 
TS 0.004596 0.018565 0.247556 0.8048 
AT 0.667979 0.501177 1.332820 0.1845 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.436653    Mean dependent var 67.15041 
Adjusted R-squared 0.361777    S.D. dependent var 73.49036 
S.E. of regression 58.71060    Akaike info criterion 11.09720 
Sum squared resid 544615.6    Schwarz criterion 11.48745 
Log likelihood -976.7480    Hannan-Quinn criter. 11.25543 
F-statistic 5.831731    Durbin-Watson stat 0.803002 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, D2E stands for debt-to-equity ratio, MCAP stands for market capitalisation, ROA 
stands for return on asset,  TS stands for tax shield ratio, AT stands for asset tangibility ratio,  S.E stands for standard error, 
S.D is the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
5.5.1.2 Basic materials 
According to the Basic materials results below, market capitalisation was the only variable 
that was significant at the 5% level of significance.  Return on assets, tax shield and asset 
tangibility were all insignificant at the 5% level of significance meaning that they had no 
explanatory power over the capital structure. 
The R squared was significant at the 5% level of significance and showed that this model 
explained 86% of the variation in Basic materials firms’ variation in capital structure. 
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Table 18: FEM REGRESSION OF BASIC MATERIALS COMPANIES - CAPITAL STRUCTURE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: D2E   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 12   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 120  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 38.19706 10.01638 3.813459 0.0002 
MCAP -0.569989 0.282368 -2.018605 0.0461 
ROA -0.018499 0.036035 -0.513364 0.6088 
TS 0.046972 0.037455 1.254074 0.2126 
AT 0.013184 0.119018 0.110771 0.9120 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.861123    Mean dependent var 35.95127 
Adjusted R-squared 0.841093    S.D. dependent var 39.33392 
S.E. of regression 15.67976    Akaike info criterion 8.466184 
Sum squared resid 25568.90    Schwarz criterion 8.837850 
Log likelihood -491.9710    Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.617119 
F-statistic 42.99090    Durbin-Watson stat 1.287387 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, D2E stands for debt-to-equity ratio, MCAP stands for market capitalisation, ROA 
stands for return on asset,  TS stands for tax shield ratio, AT stands for asset tangibility ratio,  S.E stands for standard error, 
S.D is the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
5.5.1.3 Consumer services 
The Consumer services model showed that return on assets, tax shield and asset tangibility 
were all significant at the 5% level of significance.  Market capitalisation was the only 
variable that was insignificant meaning that it had to explanatory power over the capital 
structure of firms in the Consumer services industry. 
The R squared was significant at the 5% level of significance meaning that this model 
explained 60% of the variation in the capital structure of firms in the Consumer services 
industry.  
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Table 19: FEM REGRESSION OF CONSUMER SERVICES COMPANIES - CAPITAL STRUCTURE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: D2E   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 17   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 170  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -48.62539 28.44569 -1.709412 0.0895 
MCAP 1.598333 1.507378 1.060340 0.2907 
ROA -1.737781 0.502196 -3.460362 0.0007 
TS 0.425092 0.125283 3.393055 0.0009 
AT 1.825408 0.528354 3.454899 0.0007 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.596871    Mean dependent var 35.50554 
Adjusted R-squared 0.542760    S.D. dependent var 61.29674 
S.E. of regression 41.44858    Akaike info criterion 10.40199 
Sum squared resid 255979.8    Schwarz criterion 10.78935 
Log likelihood -863.1693    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.55918 
F-statistic 11.03043    Durbin-Watson stat 1.519763 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, D2E stands for debt-to-equity ratio, MCAP stands for market capitalisation, ROA 
stands for return on asset,  TS stands for tax shield ratio, AT stands for asset tangibility ratio,  S.E stands for standard error, 
S.D is the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
 
5.5.1.4 Consumer goods 
According to the Consumer goods model below, none of the variables were significant at 
the 5% level of significance meaning that none of them had explanatory power over the 
capital structure of the Consumer goods firms. 
The R squared was significant at the 5% level of significance meaning that this model 
explained 66% of the variation in the capital structure of firms in the Consumer goods 
industry. 
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Table 20: FEM REGRESSION OF CONSUMER GOODS COMPANIES - CAPITAL STRUCTURE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: D2E   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 11   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 110  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 88.72528 30.11890 2.945834 0.0041 
MCAP -0.068998 1.536023 -0.044920 0.9643 
ROA -1.092647 0.657300 -1.662327 0.0997 
TS -0.019803 0.054726 -0.361864 0.7183 
AT -0.615712 0.463234 -1.329160 0.1870 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.665984    Mean dependent var 44.08492 
Adjusted R-squared 0.616760    S.D. dependent var 54.74102 
S.E. of regression 33.88818    Akaike info criterion 10.01013 
Sum squared resid 109098.9    Schwarz criterion 10.37838 
Log likelihood -535.5574    Hannan-Quinn criter. 10.15950 
F-statistic 13.52979    Durbin-Watson stat 0.820708 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, D2E stands for debt-to-equity ratio, MCAP stands for market capitalisation, ROA 
stands for return on asset,  TS stands for tax shield ratio, AT stands for asset tangibility ratio,  S.E stands for standard error, 
S.D is the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
5.5.1.5 Health care 
The results below that only return on asset was significant at the 5% level of significance 
while tax shield only had explanatory power that the 10% level of significance.  Market 
capitalisation and asset tangibility both had no explanatory power over the capital structure 
of firms in the Health care industry. 
The R squared was significant at the 5% level of significance and indicated that this model 
explained 81% of the variation in the capital structure of firms in the Health care industry. 
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Table 21: FEM REGRESSION OF HEALTH CARE COMPANIES - CAPITAL STRUCTURE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: D2E   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 3   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 30  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 453.6803 75.11458 6.039844 0.0000 
MCAP -1.858029 1.808227 -1.027542 0.3149 
ROA -21.77118 2.966142 -7.339898 0.0000 
TS -1.099116 0.631393 -1.740779 0.0951 
AT 0.026219 0.148385 0.176698 0.8613 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.812315    Mean dependent var 152.0290 
Adjusted R-squared 0.763354    S.D. dependent var 153.5209 
S.E. of regression 74.68219    Akaike info criterion 11.66532 
Sum squared resid 128280.9    Schwarz criterion 11.99227 
Log likelihood -167.9799    Hannan-Quinn criter. 11.76992 
F-statistic 16.59100    Durbin-Watson stat 2.036564 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, D2E stands for debt-to-equity ratio, MCAP stands for market capitalisation, ROA 
stands for return on asset,  TS stands for tax shield ratio, AT stands for asset tangibility ratio,  S.E stands for standard error, 
S.D is the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
 
5.5.2 Summary of results 
According to the results above, the regression for all companies show that return on asset 
and asset tangibility are the determinants of the capital structure of South African firms.  
The relationship between the capital structure of a firm and these two variables is negative.  
This means that the more profitable firms in South Africa are the less debt they use to 
finance their investments.  These findings support the findings by Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) 
who found that profitability was negatively related to the debt-to-equity ratio meaning that 
firms in South Africa follow the pecking order theory. 
The results for the Industrials firms also indicate that Industrial firms in South Africa follow a 
pecking order theory as return on asset is the only significant variable in the model with a 
negative relationship to debt-to-equity.   
For the Basic materials industry, our findings are a little different to Gwatidzo and Ojah 
(2009)’s findings.  In their study they found a significant positive relationship between size 
and the debt-to-equity ratio.  Our findings for firms in the Basic materials industry indicate a 
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significant negative relationship between size and the debt-to-equity ratio.  The difference 
in the relationship could be attributable to the difference in variables used as a proxy for 
size.  In their study Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) used the years of existence of a firm as a 
proxy for size and in our study we used market capitalisation as a proxy for firm size.  Our 
results indicate that firms in the Basic materials industry follow a pecking order theory as 
size has a significant negative relationship with the firm’s capital structure. 
The results for the Consumer services industry show that the capital structure of firms in 
this industry is determined by return on asset, the tax shield and asset tangibility.  Return on 
asset is negatively related to the debt-to-equity ratio meaning that firms in the Consumer 
services industry also follow a pecking order theory.  The tax shield and asset tangibility are 
positively related to the debt-to-equity ratio indicating that as the tax shield and fixed assets 
increase the more debt Consumer services firms undertake.   
For the health care industry, our findings indicate that firms in this industry follow a pecking 
order theory as there is a negative significant relationship between return on asset and the 
debt-to-equity ratio. 
These results indicate general pecking order behaviour in South African companies.  We 
therefore, reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is a relationship between the 
debt-to-equity ratio of firms in South Africa and profitability, size of firm, tax shield and 
asset tangibility. 
5.6 Research hypothesis five: is there a difference among industries in 
terms of reliance on long-term debt  
The results below graphically depict the levels of long-term borrowing (“LT Borrowing”) 
within the different industries and their persistence over the observed period.   
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5.6.1 Results presentation 
Figure 14: LONG-TERM BORROWING_OIL&GAS 
According to the figure above, Sasol relies heavily on long-term borrowing as compared to 
short-term borrowing.  The long-term debt to total debt ratio depicted in the figure above 
has been persistently above 70% from 2003 to 2011.  Between 2003 and 2004 Sasol only 
had long-term debt in their books. 
 
Figure 15: LONG-TERM BORROWING_TECHNOLOGY 
The levels of long-term borrowing in the technology sector were variable over the observed 
period.  Between 2004 and 2006, firms within this industry used more short-term borrowing 
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than long-term borrowing, however, the long-term borrowing increased to about 65% in 
2007.  The high levels of long-term borrowing were not sustained as the gradually declined. 
Figure 16: LONG-TERM BORROWING_HEALTH CARE 
The health industry relied more on short-term borrowing between 2004 and 2005 and 
thereafter the long-term borrowing levels increased.  The increase has been persistent from 
about 45% in 2005 to 80% in 2011. 
Figure 17: LONG-TERM BORROWING_TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
There are variable long-term and short-term borrowing levels for firms within the 
telecommunication industry over the observed period.  The long-term borrowing levels, 
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however, peaked at just above 80% in 2004.  These high levels gradually declined to range 
bound levels of 40% and 70% between 2005 and 2011. 
 
Figure 18: LONG-TERM BORROWING_CONSUMER GOODS 
The firms within the consumer goods industry rely more on short-term borrowing than long-
term borrowing.  The long-term borrowing levels are low peaking at 50% in 2003.  The long-
term borrowing levels are range bound within 30% and 50% from 2002 to 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: LONG-TERM BORROWING_CONSUMER SERVICES 
The figure above shows more reliance on long-term borrowing in the consumer services 
industry.  The long-term borrowing levels range between 50% and 70%. 
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Figure 20: LONG-TERM BORROWING_BASIC MATERIALS 
The basic materials industry relies more on long-term borrowing with their levels persistent 
at around just below 70% from 2009 to 2011.   
Figure 21: LONG-TERM BORROWING_INDUSTRIALS 
The industrials industry’s long-term borrowing increased from just over 40% in 2002 to just 
below 60% in 2011. 
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5.6.2 Summary of results 
According to the results presented above, the debt structure in terms of funding between 
long-term and short-term debt seems to be heavily biased towards long-term debt.  The 
reliance on long-term debt is however very different among the different industries. 
The Oil & Gas industry is heavily reliant on long-term borrowing.  Technology also relied 
heavily on long-term borrowing in the beginning of the observed period, however, these 
levels came down.  There is a high reliance on long-term debt in the health care sector as 
well and this reliance has increased more towards the end of the period.  Unlike the other 
industries Telecommunications has varying levels of short-term and long-term borrowing.  
But even so, the long-term borrowing levels of Telecommunications did peak to levels just 
below 90% around 2004.   
Firms within the Consumer goods industry used more short-term borrowing over the 
observed period with long-term borrowing levels range bound between 30% and 50%.  The 
Consumer services industry’s borrowing levels were also range bound between 40% and 
70% over the observed period.  Another industry with range bound levels was the Basic 
materials industry.  Their levels ranged between 50% and 70%.  Even though these three 
industries all had range bound levels, these levels were different from each other.  The 
Industrials firms’ use of long-term borrowing gradually increased over time over the 
observed period. 
The debt structure in terms of funding between long term and short term debt is very 
different among the different industries.  The ratios, however, indicate that all these 
industries used more long-term borrowing over the observed period.  These finding are in 
contrast to what Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) found in their study.  In their study, Gwatidzo 
and Ojah (2009), found that firms in South Africa relied more on short-term debt with long-
term debt levels at only 14%.   
The results indicate that all the sampled industries used more long-term borrowing than 
short-term borrowing over the observed period.  We conclude that the debt structure in 
terms of funding between long term and short term debt is homogeneous among the 
sampled industries, therefore, we reject the null hypothesis. 
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6 Chapter six – Summary of the findings and Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the summary of the data analysis findings presented in the previous 
chapter, the conclusions drawn from the findings followed by recommendations. 
6.2 Summary of findings  
As clearly stated above, the study sought to cover the questions, is capital structure 
irrelevant as per MM I, what is the capital structure (debt-to-equity) of firms per industry in 
South Africa, how persistent is the debt-to-equity capital structure, what factors determine 
the debt-to-equity structure divide, what is the debt structure in terms of funding between 
long term and short term debt and how persistent is the long term-short term structure.  
Several techniques were utilised to fulfil this end and each addressed a particular question.   
To establish whether capital structure is irrelevant, a panel data regression was done on all 
firms pooled across industries and an industry specific analysis was also done to establish 
the behaviours and relationships within the industries.  To establish the robustness of our 
model and expand the analysis of MM I, we also conducted an analysis by firm size. 
The general pooled analysis found the model to be significant with the adjusted R squared 
of 55%.  Although none of the variables were significant at the 5% level of significance, asset 
tangibility was significant at the 10% level of significance.  The industry specific analysis 
found all models to be significant with adjusted R squared figures of 58% for Industrials, 
48% for Basic materials, 60% for Consumer services, 81% for Consumer goods, 46% for 
Health care and for Technology 37%.  The re-specified model on all firms was significant at 
the 5% level of significance with an R squared of 73%, however, debt-to-equity was still 
insignificant.  The analysis by firm size also found all models to be significant at the 5% level 
of significance with R squared of 83%, 71% and 76% for large, medium and small firms 
respectively, however, the debt-to-equity ratio was insignificant in all models. 
This means that there is no statistically significant relationship between the firm value and 
capital structure of firms in South Africa.  These findings are highly inconsistent with 
prominent literature such as Sharma (2006), Fama and French (2002) all of whom concluded 
that there is a direct relationship between leverage and firm value.  Ward and Price (2006) 
also indicated that an increased debt-to-equity ratio increases returns for the shareholders 
for profitable firms.  Our inconsistent findings could be as a result of misspecification or 
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other unfavourable effects inherent in the data used for the analysis or it could be that the 
MM I proposition holds in the South African context. 
To establish the capital structure of firms within the different industries listed on the JSE 
descriptive statistics analysis were carried out were the mean of debt-to-equity ratios for all 
firms in each industry were computed.  According to the computed means, the Health care 
industry had the highest debt-to-equity ratio meaning that firms in this industry used more 
debt than equity as their source of capital.  The industry with the lowest debt-to-equity 
ratios was the Technology industry.  The Health care industry had a larger market 
capitalisation ratio of 33.3% as compared to the Technology industry ratio of 25%.  These 
findings imply that larger firms tend to use more debt than smaller ones.  Large firms are 
more visible and diversified than small ones and have access to easy and cheaper debt.  This 
is inconsistent, however, with the findings of the regression analysis which indicated pecking 
order behaviour of South African firms.  There may be other factors not included in this 
study that are driving the high debt-to-equity ratios of firms in the Health care industry. 
To determine the persistence of the capital structure within the different firms, the results 
above were plotted on a graph to visually illustrate the patterns of persistence.  The 
patterns of the capitals structure within the different industries varied over the observed 
period.  For some industries the patterns had sharp increases and sharp declines while for 
some it showed a range bound pattern. 
To establish factors that have an effect on the debt-to-equity divide, or simply capital 
structure of firms we employed a panel data regression as in the previous case.  All the 
models were significant at the 5% level of significance.  Our findings from the regression 
models indicated a negative significant relationship between profitability and the capital 
structure of a firm.  This is supported by previous research by Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) 
who found a negative significant relationship between profitability and capital structure.  
Mgudlwa (2009) also found that there was a negative and significant correlation between 
gearing and profitability for Manufacturing Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) 
and large sized enterprises (LSEs).  The results of the panel regressions indicated a pecking 
order behaviour which was also the findings of Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) as well as 
Mgudlwa (2009).   
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In order to determine the debt structure in terms of funding between long-term and short-
term debt we computed the long-term debt to total debt ratio and calculated the means for 
all the industries.  The results found that most of the sampled industries relied more on 
long-term borrowing than short-term borrowing.  This was in contrast to what Gwatidzo and 
Ojah (2009) had found in their study.  In their study they found that firms in South Africa 
tended to use more short-term debt than long-term debt with long-term debt levels of 14%. 
6.3 Conclusion 
It could be argued that the results on MM I summarised above are mostly inconsistent with 
recent literature and economic theory from across the world.  There is substantial literature 
that has shown that there is a relationship between firm value and the capital structure of a 
firm.  This outcome, perhaps, concur with Myers (2002) who stated that there is no 
universal theory of capital structure, only conditional ones.  Factors that are of significance 
in one context may be insignificant in another. 
An interesting future research agenda would be to find possible explanations for these 
contrasting results, starting with verifying differences in test variables proxy and testing 
techniques deployed in these studies. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1: REM REGRESSION OF ALL COMPANIES – FIRM VALUE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: MKT_CAP   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 82   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 813  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -3.69E+09 6.26E+09 -0.589290 0.5558 
DEBT_EQUITY -4.47E+08 5.60E+08 -0.798130 0.4250 
ALSI40 877561.6 197220.0 4.449659 0.0000 
EBITDA 6324.879 360.3116 17.55392 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Cross-section random 4.27E+10 0.5278 
Idiosyncratic random 4.04E+10 0.4722 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.318637    Mean dependent var 8.87E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.316111    S.D. dependent var 4.89E+10 
S.E. of regression 4.04E+10    Sum squared resid 1.32E+24 
F-statistic 126.1089    Durbin-Watson stat 1.017885 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.366958    Mean dependent var 3.06E+10 
Sum squared resid 2.81E+24    Durbin-Watson stat 0.478252 
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, DEBT_EQUITY stands for debt-to-equity ratio, ALSI40 stands for Top 40 all share 
index, EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, S.E stands for standard error, S.D is 
the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
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Table A2: OLS REGRESSION OF ALL COMPANIES – FIRM VALUE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: MKT_CAP   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 82   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 813  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DEBT_EQUITY -1.14E+09 6.92E+08 -1.652381 0.0988 
ALSI40 632723.4 119905.6 5.276846 0.0000 
EBITDA 7234.240 346.3594 20.88651 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.373091    Mean dependent var 3.06E+10 
Adjusted R-squared 0.371543    S.D. dependent var 7.39E+10 
S.E. of regression 5.86E+10    Akaike info criterion 52.42980 
Sum squared resid 2.78E+24    Schwarz criterion 52.44714 
Log likelihood -21309.71    Hannan-Quinn criter. 52.43645 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.521226    
     
     Note: DEBT_EQUITY stands for debt-to-equity ratio, ALSI40 stands for Top 40 all share index, EBITDA stands for earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, S.E stands for standard error, S.D is the standard deviation and F-
statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
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Table A3: REM REGRESSION OF LARGE FIRMS – FIRM VALUE AS DEPENDENT  
Dependent Variable: MKT_CAP   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 14   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 140  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1.53E+10 3.49E+10 -0.436995 0.6628 
DEBT_EQUITY 3.10E+09 8.27E+09 0.374963 0.7083 
ALSI40 6186411. 786321.3 7.867537 0.0000 
EBITDA 2419.349 725.0287 3.336901 0.0011 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Cross-section random 1.14E+11 0.7972 
Idiosyncratic random 5.76E+10 0.2028 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.501946    Mean dependent var 2.11E+10 
Adjusted R-squared 0.490960    S.D. dependent var 8.01E+10 
S.E. of regression 5.72E+10    Sum squared resid 4.44E+23 
F-statistic 45.68765    Durbin-Watson stat 0.696939 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.224050    Mean dependent var 1.34E+11 
Sum squared resid 1.89E+24    Durbin-Watson stat 0.164272 
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, DEBT_EQUITY stands for debt-to-equity ratio, ALSI40 stands for Top 40 all share 
index, EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, S.E stands for standard error, S.D is 
the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
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Table A4: OLS REGRESSION OF LARGE FIRMS – FIRM VALUE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: MKT_CAP   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 14   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 140  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DEBT_EQUITY 2.22E+09 1.16E+10 0.191126 0.8487 
ALSI40 5277959. 751135.0 7.026646 0.0000 
EBITDA 2898.073 928.0863 3.122633 0.0022 
     
     R-squared 0.223922    Mean dependent var 1.34E+11 
Adjusted R-squared 0.212592    S.D. dependent var 1.32E+11 
S.E. of regression 1.17E+11    Akaike info criterion 53.83545 
Sum squared resid 1.89E+24    Schwarz criterion 53.89849 
Log likelihood -3765.482    Hannan-Quinn criter. 53.86107 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.179438    
     
     Note: DEBT_EQUITY stands for debt-to-equity ratio, ALSI40 stands for Top 40 all share index, EBITDA stands for earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, S.E stands for standard error, S.D is the standard deviation and F-
statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
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Table A5: REM REGRESSION OF MEDIUM FIRMS – FIRM VALUE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: MKT_CAP   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 26   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 260  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -3.39E+08 1.68E+09 -0.202382 0.8398 
DEBT_EQUITY -1.07E+08 1.12E+08 -0.953555 0.3412 
ALSI40 742195.4 65146.74 11.39267 0.0000 
EBITDA 1609.488 306.0026 5.259721 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Cross-section random 5.81E+09 0.4167 
Idiosyncratic random 6.87E+09 0.5833 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.506003    Mean dependent var 6.22E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.500214    S.D. dependent var 9.78E+09 
S.E. of regression 6.92E+09    Sum squared resid 1.22E+22 
F-statistic 87.40728    Durbin-Watson stat 0.804085 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.421520    Mean dependent var 1.77E+10 
Sum squared resid 2.16E+22    Durbin-Watson stat 0.455231 
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, DEBT_EQUITY stands for debt-to-equity ratio, ALSI40 stands for Top 40 all share 
index, EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, S.E stands for standard error, S.D is 
the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
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Table A6: OLS REGRESSION OF MEDIUM FIRMS – FIRM VALUE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: MKT_CAP   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 26   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 260  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DEBT_EQUITY -2.76E+08 1.33E+08 -2.075913 0.0389 
ALSI40 662761.6 45425.46 14.59009 0.0000 
EBITDA 2310.735 301.3975 7.666735 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.436556    Mean dependent var 1.77E+10 
Adjusted R-squared 0.432172    S.D. dependent var 1.20E+10 
S.E. of regression 9.06E+09    Akaike info criterion 48.70262 
Sum squared resid 2.11E+22    Schwarz criterion 48.74370 
Log likelihood -6328.340    Hannan-Quinn criter. 48.71913 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.595096    
     
     Note: DEBT_EQUITY stands for debt-to-equity ratio, ALSI40 stands for Top 40 all share index, EBITDA stands for earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, S.E stands for standard error, S.D is the standard deviation and F-
statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
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Table A7: REM REGRESSION OF SMALL FIRMS – FIRM VALUE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: MKT_CAP   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 42   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 416  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -2.94E+08 3.16E+08 -0.928410 0.3537 
DEBT_EQUITY -20139405 41725175 -0.482668 0.6296 
ALSI40 135158.1 12147.04 11.12683 0.0000 
EBITDA 1765.492 201.1265 8.778017 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Cross-section random 1.31E+09 0.3751 
Idiosyncratic random 1.69E+09 0.6249 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.418837    Mean dependent var 1.25E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.414605    S.D. dependent var 2.31E+09 
S.E. of regression 1.77E+09    Sum squared resid 1.28E+21 
F-statistic 98.97430    Durbin-Watson stat 0.792218 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.426327    Mean dependent var 3.29E+09 
Sum squared resid 2.53E+21    Durbin-Watson stat 0.402290 
     
     
Note: C stands for the common intercept, DEBT_EQUITY stands for debt-to-equity ratio, ALSI40 stands for Top 40 all share 
index, EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, S.E stands for standard error, S.D is 
the standard deviation and F-statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
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Table A8: OLS REGRESSION OF SMALL FIRMS – FIRM VALUE AS DEPENDENT 
Dependent Variable: MKT_CAP   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2002 2011   
Periods included: 10   
Cross-sections included: 42   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 416  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DEBT_EQUITY -7521670. 45037045 -0.167011 0.8674 
ALSI40 82764.99 8269.668 10.00826 0.0000 
EBITDA 3191.648 194.7132 16.39154 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.491362    Mean dependent var 3.29E+09 
Adjusted R-squared 0.488899    S.D. dependent var 3.26E+09 
S.E. of regression 2.33E+09    Akaike info criterion 45.98382 
Sum squared resid 2.24E+21    Schwarz criterion 46.01289 
Log likelihood -9561.635    Hannan-Quinn criter. 45.99531 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.729887    
     
     
Note: DEBT_EQUITY stands for debt-to-equity ratio, ALSI40 stands for Top 40 all share index, EBITDA stands for earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, S.E stands for standard error, S.D is the standard deviation and F-
statistic stands for Fischer statistic 
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Appendix B 
Below is a list of JSE Securities Exchange listed companies included in the sample employed 
for the study.  
Table B1: JSE SECURITIES EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANIES BY INDUSTRY 
Company Industry 
Adcorp Holdings Limited Industrials 
AdvTECH Consumer services 
AECI Limited Basic materials 
Afgri Limited Consumer goods 
African Oxygen Limited Basic materials 
African Rainbow Min Ltd Basic materials 
Allied Elec Corp Pref Industrials 
Allied Technologies Ltd Technology 
Anglo American Plat Ltd Basic materials 
Anglo American plc Basic materials 
Anglogold Ashanti Ltd Basic materials 
ArcelorMittal SA Limited Basic materials 
Aspen Pharmacare Hldgs Ltd Health care 
Assore Ltd Basic materials 
Astral Foods Ltd Consumer goods 
Aveng Group Limited Industrials 
AVI Ltd Consumer goods 
Barloworld Ltd Industrials 
Bell Equipment Ltd Industrials 
BHP Billiton plc Basic materials 
Bidvest Ltd Industrials 
Cashbuild Ltd Consumer services 
City Lodge Hotels Ltd Consumer services 
Clicks Group Ltd Consumer services 
Combined Motor Hldgs Ltd Consumer services 
Datatec Ltd Technology 
DRD Gold Ltd Basic materials 
EOH Holdings Ltd Technology 
Exxaro Resources Ltd Basic materials 
Famous Brands Ltd Consumer services 
Gold Fields Ltd Basic materials 
Grindrod Ltd Industrials 
Group Five Ltd Industrials 
Harmony GM Co Ltd Basic materials 
Howden Africa Hldgs Ltd Industrials 
Hudaco Industries Ltd Industrials 
Illovo Sugar Ltd Consumer goods 
Impala Platinum Hlgs Ltd Basic materials 
Imperial Holdings Ltd Industrials 
Invicta Holdings Ltd Industrials 
JD Group Ltd Consumer services 
Kagiso Media Ltd Consumer services 
KAP Industrial Hldgs Ltd Industrials 
 
  88 
Company Industry 
Lonmin plc Basic materials 
Massmart Holdings Ltd Consumer services 
Mediclinic Internat Ltd Health care 
Merafe Resources Ltd Basic materials 
Metair Investments Ltd Consumer goods 
Metrofile Holdings Ltd Industrials 
Mr Price Group Ltd Consumer services 
MTN Group Ltd Telecommunications 
Murray & Roberts Hldgs Industrials 
Nampak Ltd Industrials 
Naspers Ltd -N- Consumer services 
Netcare Limited Health care 
Northam Platinum Ltd Basic materials 
Oceana Group Ltd Consumer goods 
Omnia Holdings Ltd Basic materials 
Palabora Mining Co Ltd Basic materials 
Petmin Ltd Basic materials 
Pik n Pay Stores Ltd Consumer services 
Pinnacle Tech Hldgs Ltd Technology 
PPC Limited Industrials 
Rainbow Chicken Ltd Consumer goods 
Remgro Ltd Industrials 
Reunert Ltd Industrials 
SABMiller plc Consumer goods 
Sappi Ltd Basic materials 
Sasol Limited Oil&Gas 
Shoprite Holdings Ltd Consumer services 
Spur Corporation Ltd Consumer services 
Steinhoff Int Hldgs Ltd Consumer goods 
Sun International Ltd Consumer services 
Super Group Ltd Industrials 
Telkom SA SOC Ltd Telecommunications 
The Foschini Group Limited Consumer services 
Tiger Brands Ltd Consumer goods 
Tongaat Hulett Ltd Consumer goods 
Trencor Ltd Industrials 
Truworths Int Ltd Consumer services 
Wilson Bayly Hlm-Ovc Ltd Industrials 
Woolworths Holdings Ltd Consumer services 
York Timber Holdings Ltd Basic materials 
 
